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Abstract
In recent years, the international community has come to recognize the power of investigating illicit 
enrichment for uncovering corrupt offenses. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 
(IACAC) and the United Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) are two international 
conventions that address the issue of illicit enrichment. Indonesia, as a signatory of the UNCAC, 
does not criminalize illicit enrichment as the UNCAC recommends, but it does require public officials 
to submit financial disclosures, which may be used by the Indonesian Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) to strengthen the evidence in corruption prosecutions. This system has not worked, 
however, because there is no criminal or civil prosecution for failing to file financial disclosures, or for 
giving false statements within those disclosures; further, there is no specific methods of proof to use in 
investigations. As a result, there has been significant debate over whether Indonesia should criminalize 
illicit enrichment, consistent with the recommendation of the UNCAC. Part of the debate centers on 
concerns about the rights of defendants and the threat of individual rights regarding presumption of 
innocence. Drawing from the U.S. approach to investigations in tax evasion and financial disclosure 
cases, this paper recommends that Indonesia avoid criminalizing illicit enrichment, and instead 
establish civil and criminal prosecution of financial disclosure system for fail to file and give false 
information, and incorporate indirect methods of proof for illicit enrichment investigation that may 
find evidence to strengthen corruption prosecutions.
Keywords: Illicit Enrichment, corruption eradication, prosecution, 
I. INTRODUCTION
Corruption, as a type of white collar crime, has been evolving into a 
sophisticated enterprise, making direct evidence hard to find by any le-
gal apparatus. The international community has responded to this situa-
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Law, University of Gadjah Mada, Indonesia; Global Coordinating Body (GCB) Rep-
resentative for East Asia and Pacific of the Global Youth Anti-Corruption (GYAC) 
Network; education background: University of Washington, School of Law, Asian 
and Comparative Law LL.M Program (2014) and University of Gadjahmada, 
Faculty of Law, Undergraduate (2007).
64Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
Criminal Liability of Public Officials for Illicit Enrichment: Comparing Approaches...
tion by proposing that governments look to illicit enrichment of public 
officials as a “yellow flag” that a corrupt offense has happened. for 
instance, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC) 
requires signatory parties to criminalize illicit enrichment;2 
Meanwhile, the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC) provides a non-mandatory provision for signatory states to 
consider criminalizing illicit enrichment of public officials.3There have 
been varied responses from signatory parties. While a number of coun-
tries have enacted domestic laws to criminalize illicit enrichment, others 
have established alternative systems to address this issue. This article 
examines the latter. Consistent with these alternative approaches, Indo-
nesia does not criminalize illicit enrichment of public officials. It has 
established a financial disclosure system under the corruption eradica-
tion regime, where public officials have to file financial disclosure state-
ments to the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).4 
This commission has authority to register and investigate disclosure 
statements;5 findings from this investigation may be used to strengthen 
the prosecution of corruption. In fact, this system has not successfully 
performed for several reasons. The first reason is Indonesian laws do 
not provide criminal and civil prosecution for failing to file and to give 
false statements.6 further, there are no specific methods of proof that 
may be used by the KPK to investigate illicit enrichment evident in the 
1  This article grew out of my master’s research under the supervision of Professor 
Scott Schumacher at University of Washington Law School (Spring 2014). Addition-
ally, I worked with Professor Elizabeth Baldwin over the Summer in polishing this 
article. I would like to thank both of them for their best efforts supervising me. 
2 Organization of American States, Inter American Convention Against Corruption 
[IACAC] art. IX, Marc 29, 1996, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996), available at http://
www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html.
3 United Nations Convention Against Corruption [UNCAC], Dec. 14, 2005, 2349 
U.N.T.S 41, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publica-
tions/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
4 See Undang-Undang tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi [Combating 
Corruption Act], Act. No. 31, 1999 jo. Act. No 20, 2001, art. 37; Undang-Undang Un-
dang-Undang tentang Penyelenggara Negara yang Bersih dan Bebas Korupsi [Clean-
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statements.7Consequently, many public officials have failed to file their 
financial disclosure statements, and for those who do register financial 
disclosure statements that reflect possible illicit enrichment, the KPK 
has not followed with investigations.8 Further, the KPK has to rely on 
direct evidence to investigate and prosecute corruption—evidence that 
is difficult to come by.
Like Indonesia, the U.S. does not criminalize illicit enrichment of 
public officials, but it has been using an alternative method—establish-
ing criminal and civil prosecution for financial disclosure statements and 
using tax evasion prosecution in conjunction with other charges like cor-
ruption.9 Specifically, in investigating illicit enrichment under tax evasion 
prosecution, the U.S. investigators examine tax-payers’ claims by com-
paring actual wealth with tax reports, using indirect methods of proof, 
such as net worth,10 bank deposit,11 expenditure,12 and cash13methods, In 
light of the U.S. approach, this paper claims that the Indonesian govern-
ment should consider to establishing criminal and civil prosecution for 
financial disclosure and implement indirect methods of proof, such as 
the net worth, bank deposit, expenditure, and cash methods.
First, this paper describes the problem of corruption in Indonesia, 
7 Ibid
8 See KPK, Wajib Lapor LHKPN [Public Officials Who Are Obligated to file fi-
nancial Disclosure Statements], ACCH http://acch.kpk.go.id/wajib-lapor-lhkpn (last 
visited May 22, 2014).
9 Department of International Law the Organization of American States, Signatories 
and Ratifications B 58: Inter- American Convention Against Corruption,[hereinafter 
Reservation to IACAC] http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-58.html (last vis-
ited May 22, 2014)
10 See Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9, .9.5.9.5 The Net Worth Method of Proof (here-
inafter Internal Revenue Manual 1), updated March 19, 2012 available at http://www.
irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009.html.
11 See Internal Ravenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.7 Bank Deposits Meth-
od of Proving Income (hereinafter Internal Revenue Manual 2), Updated November 5, 
2004, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009-cont01.html.
12 See Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.6. Expenditures Method 
of Proving Income (Internal Revenue Manual 3), updated November 5, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005- 009.html#d0e1812.
13 See Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.8 Cash Method of Prov-
ing Income (Internal Revenue Manual 4), updated November 5, 2004, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009-cont01.html.
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the Indonesian laws governing corruption along with Indonesian legal 
apparatus approach in investigating illicit enrichment. Next, it elabo-
rates on the problem of corruption in the U.S. along with the explana-
tion of U.S. laws governing corruption and investigating illicit enrich-
ment. This paper then analyzes what Indonesia can learn from the U.S. 
approach, recommends how to establish an illicit enrichment investiga-
tion reform in Indonesia, and gives solutions to overcome some pos-
sible obstacles to reform.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ILLICIT 
ENRICHMENT
A. OBLIGATION TO CRIMINALIZE ILLICIT ENRICHMENT
In general, the international framework, including the Inter-Amer-
ican Convention on Corruption and the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, require or recommend criminalization of illicit en-
richment. These conventions define illicit enrichment as an increasing 
of wealth that cannot be traced to legal income.14 These increases in 
wealth are sometimes particularly challenging to investigate because 
they result from corruption, which may involve public actors who trans-
fer money overseas and outside the jurisdiction of their countries of 
origin. This corrupt activity is well illustrated by recent data showed 
in a meeting of the Second Committee of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations where a Nigerian representative stated that about $400 
billion was transferred overseas from African countries. 15Similarly, 
from the mid-1990s to 2008, a leak from the People’s Bank of China 
revealed that corrupt officials sent $120 billion from China.16 Within 
the Americas, The TI reported more than $2 million of Plan Colum-
bia funds were stolen and reported taken by more than twenty corrupt 
Colombian Officers.17 Notably, investigating the overseas accounts of 
public officials on those cases has never been easy because of the lack 
14 See Organization of American States, supra note 1; United Nations, supra note 2.
15 Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and Interest in 
Combating Economic Crimes, 40 INT’L LAW. 909, 935 (2006).
16 Margaret K. Lewis, Presuming Innocence, or Corruption in China, 50 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 287, 290 (2012).
17 Luz Estella Nagle, The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin 
America, 26 fORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1649, 1686 (2003).
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of transparency in many worlds’ financial systems.18
Even though illicit, enrichment has been recognized as a serious 
problem, before the 1960s there was no significant law enforcement 
system to respond to it. Indeed, gaining suspicious wealth at that time 
was not a criminal offense, and without direct evidence of involvement 
in a corrupt scheme, a prosecution of a public official would be unlikely. 
Eventually, in 1960s, a Congressman in Argentina named Rodolfo Cor-
ominas Segura proposed a bill to prosecute public officials who could 
not reasonably explain their increasing wealth.19 Although, the exact 
proposed bill has never been approved, the idea inspired several bill 
proposals with the same concern in 1964.20
Meanwhile, India established the Prevention of Corruption Act in 
1988 that defines unknown sources of income as “income received 
from any lawful source, and such receipt has been intimated in accor-
dance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being 
applicable to a public servant.” In addition, unlike Segura’s proposal, 
India’s new law included the illicit enrichment of public officials as an 
offense of criminal misconduct in which imprisonment not less than 
one year or may be extend to seven years shall be imposed to a public 
official who commit this crime.21
Afterwards, several regional and international anti-corruption con-
ventions were established and setup specific requirements to respond 
illicit enrichment of public officials. The Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption (IACAC) is recognized as the first convention that 
defines and requires signatory parties to criminalize the illicit enrich-
ment of public officials.22 Since first introduced in 1996, this convention 
has been ratified by 34 countries.23 The purpose of this Convention is 
18 Kofele-Kale, supra note 14, at 937
19 LINDY MUZILA ET ALL, ON THE TAKE: CRIMINALIZING ILLICIT EN-
RICHMENT TO fIGHT CORRUPTION 8 (2012).
20 Id
21 The India Prevention of Corruption Act No. 48 of 1988, Chapter III: Offences 
and Penalties, Point 13, September 9, 1988, available at http://www.persmin.gov.in/
DOPT/EmployeesCorner/Acts_Rules/PCAct/pcact.pdf (last visited May 5, 2014).
22 Background, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, SECRETARIAT OF 
LEGAL AffAIRS, DEPARTMENT Of LEGAL COOPERATION, http://www.oas.
org/juridico/english/corr_bg.htm (last visited May 22, 2014).
23 Ibid 
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to prevent and prosecute transnational bribery and illicit enrichment of 
public officials.24
Specifically, Article IX defines illicit enrichment as “a significant 
increase in the assets of a public official in which he cannot reason-
ably explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance 
of his function.”25 Moreover, this Article requires a state party to estab-
lish laws that acknowledge illicit enrichment as a corrupt offense.26 This 
convention includes the illicit enrichment requirement in its mandatory 
provisions for the signatory states, yet there is no further explanation 
how to develop any methods of proof and possible punishment for this 
type of offense.27 Eight years after the establishment of the IACAC, the 
UN introduced of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC) as a universal tool to combat corruption. Like the IACAC, 
this international legal framework provides comprehensive standards, 
measures, and rules to combat corruption.28 The idea to criminalize the 
illicit enrichment of public officials was also introduced. The UNCAC 
defines illicit enrichment, in Article 20, as “a significant increase in the 
assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in re-
lation to his or her lawful income.”29 Unlike the IACAC which provides 
mandatory requirements to signatory states to criminalize the illicit en-
richment of public officials, the UNCAC recommends the criminaliza-
tion of public officials’ illicit enrichment in non mandatory provisions 
which only require signatory states to consider regulating illicit enrich-
ment as a corrupt offense.30
In addition, the United Nation on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) pub-
lished legislative guide for the implementation of UNCAC. Particu-
larly, this guidance paper mentions to implement Article 20, first, state 
parties have to incorporate article with Articles 26-30 and 42. In brief, 
those articles require the signatory parties to establish laws that include 
the liability of main actor or principal, accomplice, assistant, or investi-
24 Ibid 
25 IACAC supra note 1, art. IX.
26 Ibid 
27 Ibid 
28 Foreword of UNCAC, supra note 2
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gator of an offense in criminal, civil, or administration jurisdiction that 
make them may be punished by criminal and monetary sanction; the el-
ement of an offence consists of knowledge, intent, and purpose; a long 
statute of limitation period of allegation may be evaded by administra-
tion of justice; the Commission of offense, immunities or jurisdictional 
privileges, judicial exercise of any discretionary legal powers related 
to corruption prosecution, gravity of the offences in relation with early 
release or parole, administrative procedures (suspension, reassign, re-
moval) for a public official who is charged with an offense may respect 
the principle of the presumption of innocence and re-engagement of 
convicted person to society.31
Next, signatory states must establish investigation of illicit enrich-
ment, creating a method of proof. Specifically, as this article mentioned 
earlier, illicit enrichment may be recognized as criminal offence un-
der the Convention, but it is not a prima facie proof of corruption.32 
Therefore, methods of proof are needed in the investigation. Specifi-
cally, many signatory states have applied manifestation of presump-
tion of innocence by giving the defendant the right to give a reasonable 
explanation of the increase of his or her wealth, but still the burden 
of proof remains on the prosecutor.33 Regardless, the guidance explains 
what steps need to be established, and how some signatory states have 
criminalized illicit enrichment. Nevertheless, it offers no further expla-
nation about what tools can be used in investigating illicit enrichment 
or to what extent prosecutors must prove the enrichment relates to cor-
ruption.34
B. CHALLENGES TO CRIMINALIZE ILLICIT ENRICHMENT
While the IACAC and the UNCAC recognize illicit enrichment by 
public officials as a universal critical issue, there are several further 
questions that are not covered by those conventions. Six years after the 
UNCAC was established, the UNODC and the World Bank released a 
31 United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Legislative Guide for the Imple-
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research report that gives further guidance on illicit enrichment of pub-
lic officials under the UNCAC.35 This report explains to monitor public 
officials wealth, the government has to spend more energy to establish 
financial disclosure statement system.36 That challenging task, however, 
may be supported by countries experience in prosecuting money laun-
dering. While, in money laundering, the report explains there is no need 
to prove the underlying crimes, this proof is needed to prosecute il-
licit enrichment, but the government is not obligated to find the origin 
of money.”37 Using those approaches, the prosecution must prove that 
the enrichment in question did not come from legal income sources 
that establish “the presumption that the enrichment is the proceeds of 
corruption.”38 In turn, the defendant may defend against this presump-
tion by presenting evidence that the enrichment came from illegal in-
come sources; if the defendant fails to do so, then the presumption leads 
to a conviction, and the defendant is liable for penalties.39
In addition, the UNODC and the World Bank interpretations of the 
implementation of due process rights are more flexible, especially when 
it comes to public interest. Indeed, the report mentions several signatory 
parties’ experiences in incorporating the need to protect due process 
rights with the public interest to combat corruption.40 Since the 1960’s, 
several countries have enacted laws to criminalize this offense such as 
Argentina, Hong Kong, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Ecuador, the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, and Sen-
egal have enacted laws governing the prosecution for the illicit enrich-
ment of public officials.41
Again, there is no doubt, all of signatory states of the IACAC and 
the UNCAC support and show their commitments to combat corruption, 
but there has been a considerable debate within the State Parties related 
to the risk of violating civil rights by criminalizing illicit enrichment of 
35 LINDY MUZILA, supra note 16 at 8




40 Ibid, p. 32
41 Ibid, p. 8
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public officials. The U.S., as a pioneer in combating corruption,42 has 
decided not to be bound by the mandatory requirement of the IACAC 
and non-mandatory provision of the UNCAC about illicit enrichment.
Specifically, in the U.S.’s reservations to the IACAC, it is stated 
that the U.S. has already regulated the obligation of senior-level public 
officials in federal institutions to submit financial disclosure statements 
as subject to criminal penalties, as well as the prosecution of public of-
ficials who evade taxes of their increasing income.43 Moreover, the U.S. 
reservations maintain that putting the burden of proof on defendants, 
who cannot reasonably prove that their enrichment came from lawful 
sources, violates due process under the U.S. Constitution and funda-
mental principles of the U.S. legal system.44 As to the UNCAC, the U.S. 
reserves under special circumstances, that the state and federal laws 
will not be enough to satisfy the obligations under Chapters II and III 
of the Convention—in which the illicit enrichment provision is stated.45
Indonesia is also a signatory state party for the UNCAC, but it 
only reserves Article 66 in which it is not bound by Article 66 para-
graph 2.46 Indonesia argues that parties to disputes over interpretation 
or application of the Convention must consent to the jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice.47 Even though Indonesia is still open 
to implementing Article 20, until now like the U.S., Indonesia does 
not criminalize illicit enrichment. There has been a heated discussion 
42 The US is the first country that criminalized foreign bribery by the establishment the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (fCPA) in 1977. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE 
UNITED STATES DEPARTEMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/ (last visited May 5, 2014).
43 Department of International Law the Organization of American States, supra note 8.
44 Ibid 
45 The US reservation also mentions this Convention will not influence in any respect 
the US cooperation with other State Parties. This country is not bound by Article 66 
paragraph 2 with the same reason as this country mentions for the UNTOC’s reserva-
tion. The US reservation to UNCAC is the same with its reservation to UNTAC, in 
sense that the UNCAC shall be applied under the federalism legal framework. Specifi-
cally, for corrupt offenses under this Convention, but within states jurisdiction then the 
state laws are applied. Moreover, state does regulate the laws that are compliance with 
the obligations on preventive measures in the Convention; however they may work in 
a different manner. UNCAC, supra note 2.
46 Ibid
47 Ibid
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whether or not Indonesia criminalizes illicit enrichment. On the one 
hand, Indonesia needs to make an extraordinary effort to combat cor-
ruption by criminalizing illicit enrichment, suggesting approach like 
those already been taken in countries like Argentina and the U.K.; on 
the other hand, Indonesia has remained committed to protect defen-
dant’s right of presumption of innocence.
The U.S. reservations to both conventions have undermined several 
fundamental theories of human rights and criminal prosecution. First, 
criminalizing public officials who cannot reasonably prove their illicit 
enrichment came from legal sources would likely violate the due pro-
cess rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment of U.S. Constitution in 
which an accused person be presumed innocent until proven guilty.48 The 
presumption of innocence is shown by putting the burden of proof to 
prosecutors who present “material element of the offense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.”49 Although a defendant can defense, this application of 
burden of proof “cannot constitutionally be shifted to the defendant.”50
Again, illicit of enrichment does not constitute a prima facie case 
of corruption, and it is difficult to say whether a government may pros-
ecute a public official just because he or she gained and later could not 
explain it; thus, the U.S. prefers prosecute tax evasion as a way to in-
vestigate illicit enrichment. In tax evasion, showing that taxpayers who 
are being enriched are punished because they are avoiding taxation—
not because they have been personally enriched. They violate the law 
by trying to hide their enriched wealth from the tax system along with 
public officials who failed or gave false information in their financial 
48 Lucinda A. Low et. al., The Inter-American Convention against Corruption: A 
Comparison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 
243, 281-82 (1998). See fifth amendment of the US constitution, as written:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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disclosure statement.51 Evidence found in tax evasion crime and finan-
cial disclosure violation may be used to investigate possible predicate 
crimes, such as corruption, drug crime.
This sub-section shows that although it is critical to respond illicit 
enrichment of public officials, it has never been easy to figure out the 
best way to balance the public interest with protection of individual 
rights. Since Article 20 of the UNCAC is a non-mandatory provision, 
each signatory state has its own preference. Signatory states that prefer 
not to criminalize illicit enrichment, such as Indonesia and the U.S., use 
the illicit enrichment of public officials as a tool to investigate the cor-
rupt offense itself.
III. INDONESIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN INVESTI-
GATING ILLICIT ENRICHMENT
Since reformation 1998, Indonesia has been tremendously devel-
oped in many aspects. It has a new constitution that governs the more 
protection of human rights, the clearer separation of powers, along with 
the establishment of laws and new agencies to handle citizens’ needs.52 
In addition, the Indonesian economy has been growing stronger and 
expanding its markets rapidly. Sadly, this improvement has not yet sup-
ported by bureaucracy reform—it seems whatever the “cover” there is 
still the same “body.”53
Indeed, according to PUKAT Korupsi, corruption is pervasive al-
most in every sector from the highest to lowest level public offices. 
This corruption has worsened because judicial institutions have been 
affiliated with the mafia; therefore, although Indonesia established Un-
dang-Undang Nomor 28 Tahun 1999 (Clean State Act), Undang-Un-
dang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 jo. Undang-Undang Nomor 20 Tahun 2001 
(Corruption Act), the judicial institutions have performed poorly when 
51 Reservation to IACAC, supra note 8.
52 Adnan Buyung Nasution, Reformasi Konstitusi di Indonesian [Constitutional Re-
form in Indonesia], HUKUM ONLINE, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/
hol4057/reformasi-konstitusi-di-indonesia (last posted November 1, 2001)
53 Iqra Anugrah, Indonesia Long Journey toward Democracy, GLOBAL POLITICS, 
http://www.global- politics.co.uk/issue9/iqra/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
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it comes to combatting corruption.54
In 2001, Indonesia passed Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2001 
(hereinafter KPK Act) to establish the Indonesian Corruption Eradica-
tion Comission (hereinafter KPK) and the Special Court of Corruption 
(hereinafter Pengadilan Tipikor). Interestingly, instead of taking over 
investigation and prosecution of corruption from Indonesian National 
Police (hereinafter Kepolisian) and Indonesian Attorney General (here-
inafter Kejaksaan), under this act, the Kepolisian and the Kejaksaan 
still have authority to investigate and prosecute corruption.55 In addi-
tion, the government took broader steps to combat corruption by enact-
ing Undang-Undang Nomor 25 Tahun 2003 jo. Undang-Undang No-
mor 8 Tahun 2010 (hereinafter Money Laundering Act) along with the 
establishment of Indonesian Financial Intelligent (hereinafter PPATK). 
The collaboration between the KPK and the PPATK has brought many 
“big fish” to court. In contrast, the Kepolisian and the Kejaksaan per-
formance has not mached the success of the KPK and the PPATK.56
Notably, the performance of the KPK and the PPATK has depended 
on direct evidence, in which these institutions monitor suspicious per-
sons and transactions;57 however as this paper noticed in the first subsec-
tion, often in many corruption cases, legal apparatus could not find any 
54 During July 2012-June 2013, ICW noted there were 753 cases which most of the 
defendants got low sentences: probations for four defendants, one-year imprisonment 
for 185 defendants, one-two years imprisonment for 167 defendants, two-five years 
for 217 defendants, five-ten years for 35 defendants, 10 years above for ten defen-
dants. Upon stages in the trials, 143 defendants was freed to leave. See Indonesia 
Corruption Watch - Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia- PUKAT UGM, 
Implementasi dan Pengaturan Illicit Enrichment (Peningkatan Kekayaan Tidak Sah) 
di Indonesia [Implementation and Regulation of Illicit Enrichment in Indonesia] 26 
(published November 2013).
55 See Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 2004 tentang Kejaksaan [Prosecutor Act]; 
Penjelasan Umum [General Explanation]; Undang-Undang tentang Komisi Pember-
antasan Korupsi [KPK Act], art. 6, Act. No. 30, 2002.
56 Saldi Isra, Seratus Hari Tanpa Kejutan [100 days Without Any Surprises], ANTI 
KORUPSI, http://www.antikorupsi.org/id/content/seratus-hari-tanpa-kejutan (pub-
lished January 28, 2005).
57 Bunga Manggiasih, Tuduh Ibas, Anas Urbaningrum Diminta Tunjukan Bukti [Ac-
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direct evidence. For instance, we have been noticing many public of-
ficials are getting suspiciously enriched, but they might not be directly 
involved in a corrupt scheme.58 To this situation, direct trapping would 
not be worked. Actually, Indonesia has established obligation to pub-
lic officials to submit their financial disclosure statement in the Clean-
State Act and the KPK Act.59 As the consequences of failure to prove 
income enrichment came from legal sources, the government may be 
used the evidence to strengthen the evidence on corruption prosecution; 
60 however there is no civil and criminal prosecution for a public official 
who fails or gives false information, along with the lack of method in-
vestigation.61
As a result, many public officials do not comply with the obliga-
tion to submit financial disclosure and there is no civil and criminal 
prosecution for public officials that have been indicated suspiciously 
enriched. for instance, in 2013, the mass media reported Edhie Baskoro 
Yudhoyono, a former lawmaker and the son of President of Indonesia, 
gained incredible enrichment during the Asian Games projects, activi-
ties that landed many of his colleagues in jail.62
People were persuaded that Edhie was involved in these activities 
because of the way the news exposed how his annual incomes and as-
sets did not match; for example, his new house was valued at seven 
times his annual income per year (an unusual and untenable disparity).63 
Later, he claimed his bakery corporation had been successful enough 
to enable him to buy that house; however, his records suggested oth-
erwise.64 Despite his privilege as member of Presidency family, it has 
been noticed the KPK and the PPATK have lack of direct evidence to 
58 Legislative Guide for the Implementation of UNCAC at 103.
59 KPK Act art. 13
60 Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 37
61 Ibid 
62 Kartika Chandra, Ibas Bantah Terima Duit Wisma Atlet [Ibas Urgued He Didn’t Receive 
Money From Wisma Atlet Scandal], TEMPO.CO (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.tempo.co/
read/news/2011/12/08/063370596/Ibas-Bantah-Terima- Duit-Wisma-Atlet
63 Rendi A. Witular & Hans David Tampubolon, First Family Tax Returns Raises 
Flags, THE JAKARTA POST (January 30, 2013), http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2013/01/30/first-family-tax-returns-raises-flags.html.
64 Oki Baren, Bisnis Cantik Mas Ibas [Ibas’s fancy Business], GRESNEWS (Dec. 5, 
2011), http://gresnews.com/berita/somasi/1740512-bisnis-cantik-mas-ibas.
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bring him to corruption prosecution.65 In addition, the KPK does not 
have any indirect methods of proof to investigate his illicit enrichment 
or to tie the enrichment to possible corrupt offenses.66
Local public officials are also being tied up with illicit enrichment 
from corrupt offenses. For example, Ratu Atut Chosiyah, Former Gov-
ernor of Banten, was recently prosecuted by the KPK bribery charge in 
Lebak Local Election.67 The KPK has indicated Chosiyah was the mas-
termind of this case68 because she gave instruction to her brother, Tuba-
gus Chaery Wardana to bribe the Head of Indonesian Constitutional 
Court, Akhil Mochtar, in order to help her colleagues win the election.69 
Besides her involvement in this case, people have long suspected that 
she was tied up with corruption because of her extravagant lifestyle.70 
During 2011-2012, she traveled to many countries to purchase high end 
brands of women bags and shoes, such as, Hermes and Daikokuya.71 
These choices and purchases became more suspicious because she has 
not filed financial disclosure statement for seven years, though the KPK 
has sent her a couple of formal notices. 72
65 Indra Akuntono, KPK Akan Panggil Ibas Asalkan [KPK Would Arrest Ibas With 
Special Circumtances], KOMPAS.COM (DEC. 12, 2013).
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/12/12/1346464/KPK.Akan.Panggil.Ibas.asal-
kan.
66 Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 37
67 Oki Baren, supra note 71; See, KPK Arrests Banten Governor, THE JAKARTA 
POST (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/20/kpk-arrests-
banten-governor.html.
68 Gusti Sawabi, Perintah Menyuap Akil Mochtar Diduga dari Ratu Atut Chosiyah 
[Order to Bribe Akhil Mochtar Was Suspected Came From Ratu Atut], TRIBUN 
NEWS (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2013/10/07/perintah-
menyuap-akil-mochtar-diduga-datang-dari-ratu-atut- chosiyah.
69 Ibid
70 Wayan Agus Purnomo & Angga Sukma Wijaya, Soal Belanja Mewah Ratu Atut, Ini 
Kata Keluarga [Related to Shopping Life Style, Here Is What The Atut’s Family Thinks], 
TEMPO.CO (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/11/04/063526888/Soal-
Belanja-Mewah-Ratu-Atut-Ini-Kata-Keluarga.
71 Terungkap, Ratu Atut Kerap Belanja Keliling Dunia [Uncovered Ratu Atut Of-
ten Goes Shopping Overseas], Tempo.co (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.tempo.co/read/
news/2013/11/04/063526886/Terungkap-Ratu-Atut-Kerap- Belanja-Keliling-Dunia.
72 Silvanus Alvin, 7 Tahun Tidak Lapor Kekayaan, Harta Ratu Atut Meningkat [Seven 
Years Ignored to File Financial Disclosure Statement, Atut Has Gained Enrichment], 
LIPUTAN 6 (Oct. 12, 2013), http://news.liputan6.com/read/718485/7-tahun-tidak-
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Like the executive and legislative branches, public officials in ju-
dicial institutions have also led extravagant lives. A few months ago, 
Nurhadi, Secretary of Supreme Court, has made public attention by his 
daughter exclusive wedding ceremony in which he gave 2500 iPods 
to the guests—an estimated cost of 700 million rupiahs ($70,000).73 In 
the previous year, he bought an office table for about 1 billion rupiahs 
($100,000) and a fancy house in Senayan City, Jakarta.74
Like Atut, Nuhadi has not complied with the financial disclosure 
statement obligation for the past three years.75
In light of these stories of excess and indulgence, scholars and the 
KPK have been discussing whether Indonesia needs to change its ap-
proach to criminalize illicit enrichment or to find a different way to 
respond illicit enrichment.76 In fact, the PPATK proposed a new bill 
about asset forfeiture that would give prosecutors authority to take un-
explained wealth from public officials, but not giving criminal sanction 
unlike the UNCAC’s requirement.77 The PPATK was inspired by the im-
lapor-kekayaan-harta-ratu-atut- meningkat#sthash.n5ouE73t.dpuf.See Edwin fir-
daus, KPK Himbau Ratu Atut Segera Laporkan LHKPN [KPK Recommends Ratu 
Atut to file Her financial Disclosure], Tribun Sumsel (Oct. 6, 2013), http://sumsel.
tribunnews.com/2013/10/06/kpk-himbau-ratu-atut-segera-laporkan-lhkpn.
73 Rina Atriana, Gelar Resepsi Mewah, Sekretaris MA Nurhadi Belum Lengkapi Lapo-
ran Kekayaan [The Secretary of Supreme Court Ignored to File Financial Disclosure 
Statement for Three Years], DETIK.CO (March 18, 2014), http://news.detik.com/re
ad/2014/03/18/065203/2528677/10/gelar-resepsi-mewah-sekretaris-ma-nurhadi-be-
lum- lengkapi-laporan-kekayaan.
74 Abdul qodir, Rumah Nurhadi Terbesar di Dekat Senayan City [Nurhadi Has The 
Biggest House in Senayan City], Tribun News (March 18, 2014), http://www.tribun-
news.com/nasional/2014/03/18/rumah-nurhadi-terbesar-di-dekat-senayan-city.
75 Putri Artika R, KPK Imbau Nurhadi Lengkapi Laporan Harta Kekayaan [KPK 
Recommends Nurhadi to File His Financial Disclosure Statement], MERDEKA.COM 
(March 14, 2013), http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/kpk-imbau- nurhadi-segera-
lengkapi-laporan-harta-kekayaan.html.
76 KPK has held several discussion talking about illicit enrichment besides working on 
research paper with ICW. SeeSukma Indah Permana, ICW: Pendekatan Illicit Enrich-
ment Bisa Maksimalkan Upaya Pemiskinan Koruptor [ICW: Investigating Illicit En-
richment Would Support fighting Against Corruption], Detik.co (Nov.1, 2011), http://
news.detik.com/read/2013/11/01/173946/2401813/10/icw-pendekatan-illicit-enrichment-
bisa-maksimalkan-upaya-pemiskinan-koruptor.
77 Martha Thertina, PPATK Usulkan Ada RUU Perampasan Aset Koruptor [PPATK 
Proposes Asset Recovery Bill], TEMPO.CO (April 16, 2013), http://www.tempo.co/
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plementation of unexplained wealth prosecution in Australia.78Scholars 
and the anti-corruption community have begun to consider which steps 
should be established when the government wants to forfeit assets.79
Instead of looking to countries that criminalize illicit enrichment, 
this paper focuses in learning from the US’s approach. The next sec-
tion will start by description of Indonesian governing laws of corrup-
tion. The purpose of that description is to figure out what is the element 
of corrupt offense and how does the investigation of illicit enrichment 
give benefits to prove the element of corruption and how to use infor-
mation from the financial disclosure and tax system to investigate illicit 
enrichment.
A. INDONESIAN LAWS GOVERNING Of CORRUPTION
In tackling corruption issue, the main regulation used by legal appa-
ratus is the Combating Corruption Act. This act mentions both material 
and specific procedural laws in investigating and prosecuting corrup-
tion; however it does still apply some general procedural laws under 
Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Kitab Undang-Undang 
Hukum Acara Pidana (Criminal Procedural Law). Generally speaking, 
there are seven types of corrupt offenses under the Corruption Act.80 
This law stipulates the elements of corruption are unlawful conduct of 
a person or law entity (corporation or organization), with personal or 
group intention to be enriched, that may cause state financial lost.81 For 
bribery, particularly governed by Article 5, 12, 13 where a public of-
ficial (recipient) may be punished for bribery if he or she promises, 
seeks, receives something value that may be influenced his or her offi-
cial decisions.82 Those articles also stipulate for a person who promises, 




79 Perlunya Aturan Illicit Enrichment Untuk Cegah Korupsi [The Urgency to Regulate 
Illicit Enrichment to Combat Corruption], HUKUM ONLINE (Nov. 1, 2013).
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5273ab9aace4d/perlunya- aturan-illicit-
enrichment-untuk-cegah-korupsi.
80 See Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 5-12, 13, 18, 23, and 30.
81 Ibid, Art 2 and 3
82 Ibid, Art 5, 12 and 13
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governed by the Act may be criminally prosecuted with imprisonment 
and fines sanctions.
The Act does not have clear explanation whether a public official 
or a person who committed a corrupt offense indirectly may be pros-
ecuted under the Act. To this issue, Indonesian special judges for court 
of corruption have ruled in many cases that indirect involvement may 
be also punished under the Act if legal apparatus finds evidence linked 
to the corrupt offenses.83Again, often prosecutors have to face the lack 
of direct evidence, thus the idea to use illicit enrichment as a means to 
prosecute corruption is crucial showing that the prosecutor can indi-
rectly prove that the illicit enrichment related to corrupt offense. Before 
Indonesia signed the UNCAC, it implicitly established provisions on 
the Corruption Act that addressed illicit enrichment, Article 37 and 37 
(A). Article 37 states a defendant has a right to prove that he or she is 
innocence that may be used by the court to decide the indictment can-
not be proved.84 further, under Article 37 (A) (1), the right under Article 
37 may be used to explain about his or her wealth, along with spouse, 
children and corporation that may have the connection with him or her.85 
If he or she cannot prove his or her wealth is equal with his or her legal 
income, Article 37 (A) (2) stipulates the findings may be used by the 
court to strengthen other evidence.86 Although the defendant has right 
to explain, pursuant to Article 37 (A) (3), the prosecutor still has the 
burden of proof as mentioned in Article 66 Criminal Procedural Act.
B. INDONESIAN FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE SYSTEM
This section concerns how the Indonesian legal apparatus conducts 
its investigation of illicit enrichment. Indonesia has established a finan-
cial disclosure system under Law No 28 of 1999 concerning Clean- 
State Act. Article 5 of the Act requires that every public official have 
several main responsibilities, including submitting their financial dis-
closure statements before, during, and after their periods in office. Pub-
lic officials governed by this law are employed under the highest state 
83 A lot of public officials have been prosecuted because legal apparatus has found 
evidence, such as witness testimony or recorded communication.
84 Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 37
85 Ibid. art 37 A (1).
86 Ibid. art 37 A (2).
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bodies, the high state bodies, ministers, governors, judges, other public 
officials governed by other laws, other public officials that have strate-
gic positions.87further, Article 12 mentions the financial disclosure state-
ments have to be submitted to Indonesian Public Official Income Inves-
tigator (hereinafter Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara 
(KPKPN)).88 Moreover, under Article 20, if a public official violates his 
or her duty, such as does not file financial disclosure statement, he or she 
may be punished by administrative sanction that governed by laws.89
Later, in 2001, there was a significant change in corruption pros-
ecution by the establishment of KPK. In 2006, the KPKPN merged its 
resources to the KPK; so based on Indonesian Administration Minis-
ter Memorandum, the KPKPN was dissolved.90 The KPK, particularly, 
takes over the KPKPN authority on financial disclosure system.91 In sum-
mary, the KPK has the authority to prosecute and supervise cases and 
prevent corruption.92 For the prevention, under Article 13 (a) KPK Act, 
it includes registering and examining financial disclosure statement of 
public officials and establishes a special subdivision under prevention 
division to handle it.93 As governed by the Clean-State Act, financial 
disclosure statement must be submitted before, during, and after office 
period.94 Specifically, under Article 48, this independent institution may 
require a defendant to give an explanation about his or her wealth along 
with spouse, children, and anyone or corporate that could be related to 
87 Public officials in strategic positions including director, commissioner, and other 
senior public official of state and local enterprises, head of Indonesia National Bank, 
head of public universities, senior public officials within civil, military and police 
institutions, prosecutors, investigators, clerks, head and treasurer of public projects. 
Clean-State Act, supra note 3, art. 2
88 Ibid. art. 12
89 Ibid, art 20
90 Astrid Felicia Lim, KPKPN Resmi Bubar [KPKPN officially Shut Down], DETIK.
CO (June 29, 2006), http://news.detik.com/read/2004/06/29/113149/169807/10/kpk-
pn-resmi-bubar.
91 Clean-State Act, supra note 3, art. 71 (2) stipulates KPK has duty and authority of 
KPKPN mandated by Article 70 Clean-State Act. As a result, Article 70 is no longer 
applicable.
92 KPK Act, supra note 61, art. 7.
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corrupt offenses in which the defendant is being prosecuted. 95
Unlike the Clean-State Act, the KPK Act gives does more to im-
prove the financial disclosure system with the establishment of financial 
disclosure subdivision. Unfortunately, like the Clean-State law, it does 
not give what kind of financial information must be submitted, what 
kind of sanction may be imposed and what kind of method may be used 
if the KPK wants to use it to strengthen the evidence. As a result, only a 
few public officials file their financial disclosure statements and for reg-
istered financial disclosure statements there is no further investigation.96
Eventually, the lack of Clean-State Act and KPK Act have a bit re-
covered by the establishment of Surat Edaran Menteri Negara Pen-
dayagunaan Aparatur Negara Nomor: SE/03/M.PAN/01/2005 tentang 
Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara (The Administra-
tion Minister Memorandum about Financial Disclosure Statement) 
and Keputusan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Nomor: KEP. 07/
KPK/02/2005 tentang Tata Cara Pendaftaran, Pemeriksaan dan Pen-
gumuman Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara (The KPK 
Memorandum about financial Disclosure Statement). The first memo-
randum gives a broader definition of public official governed by finan-
cial disclosure obligation. It includes second upper level of public of-
ficials in governmental institutions or agencies, head of office divisions 
in the finance Ministry, public officials in export and import bureau, 
tax investigators, auditors, signatory representatives in public projects, 
head of public service institutions, and signatory representatives in law-
making process.97
Meanwhile, the KPK’s memorandum states that the KPK must take 
several steps in handling financial disclosures.98 First, after public of-
ficials registered, the KPK collects their financial disclosure statements 
95 Ibid
96 Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 37.
97 Surat Edaran Menteri Negara Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara Nomor: SE/03/M.
PAN/01/2005 tentang Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara [Administra-
tion Minister Memorandum about Financial Disclosure Statement], 2005.
98 Keputusan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Nomor: KEP. 07/KPK/02/2005 ten-
tang Tata Cara Pendaftaran, Pemeriksaan dan Pengumuman Laporan Harta Kekayaan 
Penyelenggara Negara [KPK Memorandum about Financial Disclosure Statement], 
2005, art. 4, 5, 6, 7.
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public officials through its sub-division.99 Next, this institution exami-
nation and add the information to its information system.100 Hence, the 
KPK pulls out these financial disclosure statements to its website, and 
its billboard, government institutions billboards where the public of-
ficials work for, national or local newspapers depend on the public of-
ficials’ residences.101 for the examination, the KPK takes three steps: 
administration, substance, and specific examination.102 While in admin-
istration checking step, the KPK looks through the validity of informa-
tion written in the statement, and documents related to it.104103 after that, 
in checking the substance, the KPK compares and analyzes a public 
official’s wealth before, during, and after office period, along with his 
or her historical position and increasing of wealth.104
In the specific examination, the KPK works based on public reports 
showing that a public official is suspiciously enriched and his or her 
enrichment may be related to corruption—in this step, the KPK may be 
supported by other institutions—before conducting this examination, 
the KPK must give notice to the public official.105 To gathering infor-
mation, the KPK has the authority to use any information based on a 
public official’s claims or possible unreported income, interviewing his 
or her colleagues, employees in related corporation, officer on his or her 
institution, and neighborhood residences, taking pictures and/or making 
visual material of the examination objects.106
To support the implementation of financial disclosure, Article 11 of 
the Memorandum recommends heads of governmental institutions both 
national and local may file names of public officials that are obligated 
to file financial disclosure statements.107 Those Memoranda give many 
steps ahead in addressing illicit enrichment which are giving broader 
definition of public officials; providing forms explain what kind of in-
99 Ibid. art. 4 and 5
100 Ibid. art. 6 and 7.
101 Ibid. art. 5.
102 Id. art. 6
103 Ibid, 6 (4)
104 Ibid 
105 Ibid. art. 6 (8) and (9).
106 Ibid. art. 7 (3).
107 Id. art. 11.
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formation that must be filled, further it sort of explaining what steps of 
specific examination when it comes to suspicious enrichment. These 
steps look like what the U.S. has which is called as the indirect methods 
of proof.108In fact, this Memorandum is just beautifully written words 
because it is not supported by strong obligation for public officials to 
file financial disclosure statement—for instance, in the middle of Ratu 
Atut investigation, the KPK recommends her to file her late seven years 
financial disclosure statement, she does not care at all.109 
C. INDONESIAN PROSECUTION fOR TAX EVASION
While there are other tools for examining the increasing wealth of 
public officials, those tools are contained in other laws and managed 
by other government institutions; furthermore, they are not very effec-
tive. For example, a taxpayer110 is obligated to file a tax report every 
year to Indonesian Department of Tax under the Ministry of Finance 
(Direktorat Jendral Pajak).111 The tax report is a confidential document 
unless Courts, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Finance ask 
the report for investigation purposes.112 Besides the authority to register 
tax report and collect tax, the Directorate General of Tax (Direktorat 
Jendral Pajak) has special agents who investigate tax evasion called 
the Civil Tax Investigator (PPNS Pajak), after that the Attorney will 
continue to indict the defendant.113 If a taxpayer fails to file or gives 
false information on this tax report, he or she may be charged by civil 
and criminal charges.114
Despite its strong authority, the Department of Tax has not yet per-
formed effectively to register and collect taxes. Approximately, only 
108 Internal Revenue Manual, supra note 9, 10, 11, and 12.
109 Alvin, supra note 78
110 See Undang-Undang Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 jo. Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 
2000 jo. Undang-Undang 6 Tahun 1983 tentang Ketentuan Umum dan Tata Cara Per-
pajakan [Indonesian Tax Act], 2007, art. 1 Point 2.
111 Ibid. art. 2
112 Ibid. art. 34
113 Ibid. art. 1 Point 31
114 Criminal penalty for tax evasion is minimum six months and maximum six years 
and fine minimum two times or maximum four times of the actual tax actual payable. 
Id. art. 39.
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8.8 million taxpayers file tax reports and pay their taxes every year.115 
In fact, the Department of Tax estimated there are more than 67 mil-
lion taxpayers who have sufficient incomes to pay taxes.116 It has been 
recognized Indonesian citizens still have lack awareness to pay taxes,117 
but the fact that this institution has been tied up with corruption cases 
also contributes in reducing people trust to the institution.118 A number 
of tax investigators have been charged with corruption.119 It is also has 
been noticed that the Attorney does have the lack of indirect methods 
of proof to convict tax evasion and connect it with other crimes, such 
as corruption.120
Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded, illicit en-
richment cases do not provide an opportunity to the legal apparatus to 
uncover corruption because the financial disclosure system does not 
work—nor does the tax system. The financial disclosure system is not 
supported by civil and criminal sanction that may be imposed if a pub-
lic official fails to file or gives false information and specific method 
of proof for conducting an investigation ties to corruption charges.121 
Meanwhile, the Civil Tax Investigator has poorly performed to impose 
115 Potensi Wajib Pajak di Indonesia Baru 67 Juta Orang [67 Million People: Small 




117 Herry Susanto, Membangun Kesadaran dan Kepedulian Sukarela Wajib Pajak 
[Enhancing Awarness to Pay Taxes], PAJAK (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.pajak.go.id/
content/membangun-kesadaran-dan-kepedulian-sukarela- wajib-pajak.
118 Zaki Al Hamzah, SBY: Cermati Korupsi Pajak [SBY: Monitors Corruption in Tax 
System], REPUBLIKA ONLINE (ROL) (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.republika.co.id/
berita/koran/news-update/13/12/09/mxjq7f-sby-cermati-korupsi- pajak. Hendrizal, 
Pajak dan Masalah Transparansi [Tax and Problem of Transparency], PELITA (April 
11, 2014), http://www.pelita.or.id/baca.php?id=92915.
119 PPATK published 83 tax officials have tied up with suspicious transactions. Adyan 
Mohamad, Kemenkeu Sanksi 83 Pegawai Karena Transaksi Mencurigakan [Ministry 
of finance Gives Sanctions to 83 Officials Who Have Been Tied Up with Suspicious 
Transaction], MERDEKA.COM (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.merdeka.com/uang/ke-
menkeu- hukum-83-pegawai-karena-transaksi-mencurigakan.html
120 Pusdiklat Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia, Penelurusan Aset [Asset Tracing] 10-14, 
available at
http://www.kejaksaan.go.id/pusdiklat/uplimg/file/PENELUSURAN%20ASET.pdf.
121 Clean-State Act, supra note 3, art. 20.
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tax return and enforce civil and criminal prosecution for tax evasion.122 
In addition, there is no indirect method of proof taken place to investi-
gate illicit enrichment and reach the goal to strengthen the evidence in 
prosecuting corruption.123
IV. ILLICIT ENRICHMENT AS A TOOL IN INVESTIGATING 
CORRUPTION IN THE US
Unlike Indonesia, according to the TI, the U.S. is categorized as a 
country with a low- corruption perception. for example, in 2012, this 
reputable NGO put the U.S. in 19th from 176 countries based on cor-
ruption perception index in the public sector.124 This country has suc-
ceeded to boost its position, since the year before, the U.S. fell into 
24th due to the economic crisis which was decreasing the public trust.125 
Furthermore, the TI also categorized the U.S. as a country who has been 
performing actively for combating bribery to foreign government by 
its Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA);126 however, those perceptions, 
which only give a general description, do not confirm that corruption 
does not exist in the U.S.
for example, in 2013, the TI held special survey for bribery, within 
a year more than 7% of Americans told that they paid bribe to eight ma-
jor services such as judiciary, registry and permit services, and educa-
tion services.127 Although bribery is not pervasive from highest to low-
122 infobanknews.com, supra note 123.
123 Pusdiklat Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia, supra note 127.
124 TI, Corruption Perception Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY, http://www.transpar-
ency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
125 The 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 182 countries and territories based on 
how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be in which the more clean their public 
sector than the higher their ranks. TI, Corruption Perceprtion Index 2011, TRANS-
PARENCY, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
126 TI, EXPORTING CORRUPTION PROGRESS REPORT 2013: ASSESSING 
ENfORCEMENT Of THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING fOREIGN 
BRIBERY 84, 2013, available at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/export-
ing_corruption_progress_report_2013_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd (last vis-
ited May 22, 2014).
127 Allie Bidwel, Majority of Americans Say Corruption Has Increased, US NEWS 
(June 10, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/07/10/majority-
of-americans-say-corruption-has-increased,
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est level, at least every year the US legal apparatus prosecutes high and 
low-level public officials in bribery cases. Recently, the former gover-
nor of Virginia, Bob Mc.Donell and his wife were indicted by federal 
jury trial with fourteen counts of illegally accepting gifts and loans from 
a political supporter, Jonnie Williams.128 In brief, Williams gave about 
$50,000 loan to cover Mc.Donell’s mortgage, and he also paid Donell’s 
daughter wedding reception expenses.129 While he claimed that what he 
gained was a legal gratuity, the government alleges that he received this 
money in exchange for his support of scientifically-unproven dietary 
supplements made by William’s company.130 Prior to the trial, the inves-
tigation was begun by the IRS’s suspicion over Mc.Donell’s tax report, 
which did not show the expensive wedding reception of his daughter or 
the mortgage payment. 131
Another example of public officials who were getting suspiciously 
enriched is Randall Cunningham. He was a former Republican con-
gressman from San Diego who was charged by several counts: bribery, 
mail fraud, and wire fraud.132 Later, he was convicted of accepting $2.4 
million including cash, home payments, furnishings, cars and posh hol-
iday expenses from several contractors and sentenced for seven years 
imprisonment.133 It has been reported that Cunningham’s unusual house 
sales to contractor Mitchell Wade was a lead fact in investigating this 
case. Wade bought the house for about $1.6 million from Cunningham, 
128 David Sherfinski, Democratic Governors in VA also Took Expensive Gifts under 





131 Arlette Saenz, Ferraris, Rolexes And A Shopping Spree: Inside The Extravagant 
Life Of Bob McDonnell And His Wife, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 21, 2014), http://abc-
news.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/01/ferraris-rolexes-and-a-shopping-spree-inside-
the-extravagant-life-of-bob-mcdonnell-and-his-wife/ (posted Jan 21, 2014).
132 Ed Henry & Mark Preston, Congressman Resigns After Bribery Plea: Califor-
nia Republican admits selling influence for $2.4 million,CNN.COM (nov. 28, 2005), 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/11/28/cunningham/.
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but Wade then sold the house for about $700,000 less.134 Another lead is 
Cunningham’s increase of valuable assets including a suburban Wash-
ington condominium, a yacht and a Rolls Royce car.135 The prosecutor 
said Cunningham used his influence to help the contractors to get some 
government projects.136 The U.S. did not prosecute McDonell or Cun-
ningham, for their illicit enrichment, but it used tax evasion in look-
ing through their illicit enrichment and corroborated the evidence to 
convict tax evasion charge. Further, the evidence could be lead to the 
underlying crime such as bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, along with 
conspiracy and RICO. Those cases confirm the U.S. reservation to the 
UNCAC which the U.S. does not criminalize illicit enrichment, but it 
does use illicit enrichment as a tool to investigation further crimes like 
corruption.
As a guidance, first this sub-section describes law governing corrup-
tion—find out what is the element of corrupt offense especially bribery 
and illegal gratuity—and then showing how the U.S. use illicit enrich-
ment of public official as a tool to investigate corruption. General ex-
planation of the U.S.’s law governing corruption can be seen by looking 
to its reservation to the UNCAC. It is stated that this convention govern-
ing corruption has to be implemented in consideration with federal and 
state criminal laws. While the U.S. law governing corruption is rooted 
in state law, the federal government may exercise its jurisdiction when 
it comes to conduct that affects “interstate or foreign commerce, or an-
other federal interest.”137 In other words, this encompass jurisdiction au-
thorized federal laws to prosecute federal officials and state officials 
for bribery and illegal gratuity, and also establish offenses that relate to 
corruption, such as, tax evasion, mail fraud, wire fraud, Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO), conspiracy, mail and wire 
fraud, and money laundering.
In Cunningham’s case, federal jurisdiction was taken place because 
he was a former federal official. He was charged and convicted for sev-
134 Hendry, supra note 140
135 Ibid
136 Richard Marosi, Contractor Gets 12 Years for Bribing Congressman, LOS AN-
GELES TIMES (feb. 20, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/20/local/me-
duke20.
137 See UNCAC, supra note 2.
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eral federal charges: bribery, mail, and wire fraud. While Mc.Donell was 
a former state official, he is being indicted for fourteen federal charges 
of illegally gratuity showing that his conducts relate to interstate com-
merce by using his power to support the dietary-supplement company. 
Like Mc. Donell, in United States v. Coyne, the Supreme Court held that 
the federal bribery charges must stand showing the fact the defendant, 
James J. Coyne was a former county executive in Albany was conspired 
with Crozier Associates, a company doing business in interstate com-
merce, to help this company be selected in a project in Albany.138
Looking to those cases, it can be concluded it does not matter 
whether petty or high profile corruptions since the nature of corruption 
as a white collar crime it has to be supported by many other offenses; 
thus to this point, federal laws may exercise it jurisdiction. This paper 
does not focus to analyze this downside or upside this encompass ju-
risdiction, but in order to get into the research questions of this paper, 
this subsection uses the encompass feature to specify analysis to federal 
laws governing corruption: bribery and illegal gratuity and some of-
fenses related of corruption.
A. THE LAWS GOVERNING BRIBERY AND ILLEGAL GRATUITY
First, for bribery, the U.S. Constitution as the Supreme Law of the 
Land mentions in Article II, Section 4, all public officials “shall be 
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” This provision is fur-
ther governed by federal and state laws. for federal officials, they are 
bound by 18 U.S.C. §201 (a), (b), and (c) about bribery of public of-
ficials and witnesses. Specifically, the §201 (a) gives definition of some 
statutory words. Continued by the §201 (b) which governs prohibition 
giving and accepting bribery, and §201 (c) regulates prohibition giving 
and accepting illegal gratuity.139 In summary, under 18 U.S.C. §201 (b), 
a public official is liable for bribery if he or she “directly or indirectly, 
corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or ac-
cept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity,”140 
as a payback for: “being influenced in the performance of any official 
138 United States v. Coyne, 4 f.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 1993).
139 The next explanation only focuses in provisions for public official.
140 18 U.S.C. §201 (b) (2) West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L. 113-79))
89
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
act,”141 “being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude 
in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any 
fraud, on the United States;”142 or “being induced to do or omit to do any 
act in violation of the official duty of such official or person;”143 or “be-
ing influenced in testimony under oath or affirmation as a witness upon 
any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in return for absenting 
himself therefrom.”144
Further, §201 (c) (1) (B) governs illegal gratuity where any pub-
lic official or a person selected to be a public official who “directly 
or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or 
accept anything of value personally for or because of any official act 
performed or to be performed by such official or person,”145 or “because 
of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such 
person as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, 
or for or because of such person’s absence therefrom.”146 The differ-
entiation between bribery and illegal gratuity is governed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers. The Court 
distinguished section b and c of §201 as two separate crimes with dif-
ferent the set of punishments. The section b of §201 is bribery because 
it requires corrupt intention of the giver,147 along with the public official 
or selected public official’s intention to be influenced in performing 
any official act as a pay back.148 Meanwhile, illegal gratuity governed 
by §201 (c) only requires “something of value was given, offered, 
or promised to a public official”149 by any individual, or “demanded, 
sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by a 
public official,”150 “for or because of any official act performed or to be 
141 Ibid. (b) (2) (A).
142 Ibid. (b) (2) (B).
143 Ibid. (b) (2) (C).
144 Ibid. (b) (4).
145 Ibid. (c) (1) (B)
146 Ibid. (c) (1) (B)
147 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404, 119 S. Ct. 
1402, 1406, 143 L. Ed. 2d, p. 576 (1999)
148 Ibid
149 Ibid. at 404-05
150 Ibid
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performed by such public official.”151 There is no need for prosecutors to 
figure out corrupt intention for illegal gratuity.
for bribery, an individual and a public official should be punished 
by fine “under this title or not more than three times the monetary 
equivalent of the thing of value, or imprisonment for not more than 
fifteen years and/or be [expelled] from holding any office of honor, 
trust, or profit under the United States.”152 This punishment consists of 
monetary, criminal, and administrative sanctions that are harsher than 
illegal gratuity where provides monetary sanction under this title or im-
prisonment for not more than two years, or both.153 Pursuant to those 
Articles, to prove a public official committed bribery or illegal gratuity, 
there must be something value was given, offered, or promised. In fact, 
it is difficult to legal apparatus to detect the transaction that requires 
“enormous costs and complexities” in investigating it, often it ends up 
“fruitless.”154 Knowing the difficulties to detect corrupt transaction, as 
this paper mentioned in previous subsection, the illicit enrichment of 
public officials is recognized as a “yellow flag” that corruption may 
happen. To this point, as the U.S. mentions in its reservation to the IA-
CAC and the UNCAC, this country established financial disclosure and 
tax evasion prosecution that may be joined with corruption charges.
B. fINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND TAX EVASION PROSECU-
TION AS TOOL TO COMBAT ILLICIT ENRICHMENT
1. The U.S. Financial Disclosure System and Prosecution
The U.S. financial disclosure system is rooted in Ethics in Govern-
ment, § 101, 5 U.S.C.A. App. 4. Under this statute, within thirty days 
after being selected as a public official, an individual is obligated to 
file a financial report. The term public official includes senior level of 
public officials under three branches of power.155 Moreover, §101 refers 
151 Ibid
152 18 U.S.C. §201 (b), supra note 148, (4).
153 18 U.S.C. §201 (c) (3) West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L. 113-79)).
154 Steven M. Levin, Illegal Gratuities in American Politics: Learning Lessons from 
the Sun-Diamond Case, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1813, 1817 (2000).
155 for example, President, Vice President, executive branch employees along with 
special government employees (5 U.S.C.A. App. 4. § 202 of title 18 West, Westlaw 
through P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L. 113-79)).
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to §102 (b) about what information do these public officials have to 
submit. Public officials and candidate of public officials should include 
a full and complete statement with respect to the information required 
by this statute: source, type, and amount or value of income during the 
preceding year.156
The source of income consist of dividends, rents, interest, and cap-
ital gains which exceeds $200 in amount or value; gifts aggregating 
more than the minimal value as 5 U.S.C. § 7342(a)(5), or $250, which-
ever is greater, received from any source other than a relative of the re-
porting individual; liabilities owed to any creditor other than a spouse, 
or a parent, brother, sister, or child of the reporting individual or of the 
reporting individual’s spouse which exceed $10,000; sale or exchange 
which exceeds $1,000; previous and outside positions income on busi-
ness and organization, agreements for future employment, or a leave 
of absence during the period of the reporting individual’s Government 
service; continuation of payments by a former employer other than the 
U.S. Government, or continuing participation in an employee welfare 
or benefit plan maintained by a former employer; blind trust.157
Based on the explanation above, financial disclosure requirement is 
not only governed public officials but also their spouses and children. 
All information has to be submitted annually by May 15 of each year 
to a special ethics agency under the institution where the public offi-
cials are employed. for instance, the President and the Vice President 
have to file the report with the Office of Government Ethics (OGE).158 
Meanwhile, other executive branch employees must submit their report 
to specific ethic agency under their institution.159 Members and staffs 
of the House of Representatives should file their report to the Clerk of 
the House while Senators and its staffs file copies of their reports to 
156 See 5 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)-(8) West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L. 
113-79)).
157 Unless the trust instrument was executed prior to July 24, 1995 and precludes the 
beneficiary from receiving information on the total cash value of any interest in a 
qualified blind trust. Id.
158 Jack Maskell, Financial Disclosure by Federal Officials and Publication of Disclo-
sure Reports Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service at 7, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43186.pdf (2012).
159 Ibid
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the Secretary of the Senate.160 Moreover, public officials under judicial 
branch have to submit their reports to the Judicial Conference.161 Article 
§101 also bound federal campaign candidates in which they have to file 
reports within thirty days of becoming candidates, or before May 15 
of that calendar year but no later than 30 days before the election. For 
continuing candidate—incumbent who are running again in the elec-
tion, they must report their financial information governed by §102 (b).
As the U.S. mentions in its reservation to the IACAC, financial dis-
closure provides sanction if a public official knowingly and willfully 
gives any false information or fails to report within period time governed 
by the statute. First, the U.S. Attorney General may bring civil action to 
court in which the court may impose a civil penalty a civil penalty in any 
amount, not to exceed $50,000. for criminal sanction, a public official 
who knowingly and willfully gave false information shall be fined under 
title 18 the United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or 
both; meanwhile for who knowingly and willfully failed to file, he or she 
may be fined under title 18 the United States Code.
Although §101 seems clear to establish the obligation of public of-
ficials to file financial disclosure report, this statute has been challenged, 
for example, in United States v. Jefferson where the court granted the 
Ethics in Government Act (“EIGA”)’s motion for entry of default judg-
ment and assessed a civil penalty in the amount of $11,000 against the 
defendant,162 showing the fact that he did not file report within thirty 
days after his employment termination to the Ethics in Government Act 
(“EIGA”).163 In the reasoning the court cited to United States v. Tarver in 
which an individual is liable for knowingly and willfully fails to comply 
with the EIGA’s filing requirements when that individual “intentionally 
disregards the statute or is indifferent to its requirements.”164 Addition-
ally, the court cited to United States v. Bank of New England, N.A. in de-
fining “willfulness for purposes of federal regulatory statutes as a disre-
gard for the governing statute and an indifference to its requirements.”165 
160 Ibid
161 Ibid, p. 9
162 United States v. Gant, 268 f. Supp. 2d 29, 34 (D.D.C. 2003).
163 Ibid at 30




Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
The court reasoned the fact that the defendant understood his position as 
an employee of executive branch subject to §101, received a reminder 
memoranda and called from the agency is sufficient to show he was 
knowingly and willfully failed to file his financial report.166
2. The U.S. Prosecution for Tax Evasion
The US mentions its reservation to the IACAC that it does not crim-
inalize illicit enrichment, but it establishes civil and criminal prosecu-
tion for tax evasion. This investigation is used illicit enrichment of a 
taxpayer as a means to be investigated. In addition, this investigation 
may lead legal apparatus to other committed crimes—why did tax-
payers hide their enrichment; there are many possibilities of motives: 
they may be greed167 or they cannot resist it may be related to crimes.168 
Henceforth, the investigation of tax evasion is joined with other crimes 
for example drug crime, and corrupt offenses: fraud, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and bribery;169 however all of these crimes are categorized as 
white collar crimes in which it is challenging for legal apparatus to 
find “direct evidence”170 of the crimes. Responding this problem, the US 
legal apparatus has been using the indirect methods of proof. Before 
explaining, the use of indirect methods of proof in tax evasion prosecu-
tion, this paper will describe what the tax evasion prosecution is and 
how does this crime relate to corruption.
166 ibid
167 See Allan G. Burrow, Effective Cross-Examination: A Practical Approach for Pros-
ecutors Part II, 44 ADVOCATE 8, 9 (2001).
168 See Teresa E. Adams, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges to White Collar 
Crimes: What Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing? 17 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 531, 551 (2000).
169 For instance, the net worth method of proof is applicable to fraud, waste, and abuse 
cases. See Richard A. Nossen, “One-on-One”’ Uncorroborated Testimony: The Di-
lemma of Prosecutors, Defense Attorneys, and the Courts in Fraud, Waste, and Abuse 
Cases, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1023 (1983).
170 Evidence” is a much narrower term. It includes only such proof as is admissible at 
trial by the act of the parties or through such concrete facts as witnesses, records, or 
other documents. Proof is the end result or effect of evidence, while evidence is the 
medium or means by which a fact is proved or disproved.
Direct evidence proves a fact, without an inference or presumption, and conclusively 
establishes that fact without reference to any supporting evidence. Direct evidence 
is evidence of the precise fact in issue and is distinguished from circumstantial i.e., 
“indirect, “ evidence.
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Tax evasion is governed by 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201, attempt to evade 
or defeat tax. An individual commits tax evasion if he or she “willfully 
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title 
or the payment,” in which under this law he or she may be guilty of a 
felony and “shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the 
case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, 
together with the costs of prosecution.” Likewise, violation financial 
disclosure statement, in tax evasion, the government must prove the 
defendant’s willfulness to avoid tax. In many cases, the jury has been 
convinced by the government’s evidence showing that defendants tried 
to hide their increasing wealth by destroying their books and records, 
purchasing property under their fake names or their spouses or family’s 
member names (like in Mc.Donell’s case). There are several cases that 
give a better understanding what are the elements of tax evasion. For 
instance, in general, courts ruled that in tax evasion, the government 
must present: (i) “the existence of a tax deficiency; (ii) an affirmative 
act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax; and (iii) 
willfulness.”171 Importantly, the government has the burden of proving 
each element of tax evasion beyond a reasonable doubt.172
3. Joinder Counts of Tax Evasion and Corruption
In many cases, conviction of corruption was joined by other charges 
related, such as tax evasion. In general, courts held that joinder counts 
may be used for bribery and tax evasion. For instance, in United States 
v. Anderson, the Seven Circuit affirmed that the trial court judgment be-
cause the jury instruction was not error. The court reasoned the govern-
ment showed adequate evidence to convict the defendants for bribery 
and RICO. Further, the government was permissible to exercise mail 
fraud, joinder counts with tax evasion were not error, and final applica-
tion of probation officer sentencing council is not retroactively.173
The case began with an undercover investigation to the defendants’ 
corrupt business. In summary, there were two defendants in this case: 
John Marine, an official at the Lake Country County Court in Crown 
171 Ethan Bercot, John Thompson, Tax Violations, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1559, 1567 
(2013).
172 Ibid
173 United States v. Anderson, 809 f.2d 1281, 1290 (7th Cir. 1987)
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Point, Indiana, has worked to process bailiff of defendants from their 
probation officers to the case coordinator and then to the office manager 
and Kenneth Anderson, a barber in Crown Point.174 One day Anderson 
was contacted by an undercover FBI agent named “Dan Mingo” to help 
him get rid his DIU charge with $1600 as a payment, Anderson agreed 
and told Mingo, there would be someone took care of it.175Apparently, 
Marine was the guy who had access to court computer and would be 
able to erase Mingo’s file.176 This mission was failed because, as Marine 
told Anderson, the computer was error.177 Later, Mingo asked Ander-
son to handle “Richard Ryan” (another FBI agent) case; again Ander-
son agreed to do so. Both Anderson and Marine then were brought to 
court for multiple counts including bribery, hobbs act, RICO. Marine, 
individually, was also charged for tax evasion.178These charges also in-
cluded ten other incidents of bribery beside Mingo and Ryan trapping.179
To the point of joinder counts, Marine urged the government made 
an error in joining his other counts with tax evasion that based on an-
other case, Mulvihill.180 The court referred to “Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 8, joinder of counts is permitted when ‘the offenses charged 
... are based on the same act or transaction ...’ while in this case, bribery 
on Mulvihill became the predicate crime of RICO, and a foundation of 
hobbs act count and was one of unreported income for his tax evasion 
count.”181 The court distinguished this case with United States v. Kenny 
and United States v. Kopituk, showing that in Kenny, the court ruled 
joinder of tax evasion count is appropriate when it is based upon direct 
income from activities charged by other counts because in both of these 
cases, there was only one unreported income.182 In fact, in Anderson, al-







180 Ibid. at 1288.
181 Ibid 
182 Ibid. See also United States v. Kenny, 645 f.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1981), United States 
v. Kopituk, 690 f.2d 1289, 1314 (11th Cir. 1982).
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fact the tax evasion was some of based on this income;183 however, the 
jury convicted a lessen offense for him which only filing a false return 
that lead Marine to urge before this court that this joinder could not be 
exist.184 The court emphasized the evidence shown by the government 
was clear and joined counts could stand.185
C. THE USE Of INDIRECT METHOD Of PROOf IN INVESTI-
GATING ILLICIT ENRICHMENT
The tax evasion sub-chapter mentioned the government has the bur-
den of proof to convict a defendant; in fact, often direct evidence could 
not be found because it has been destroyed or covered by the defendant. 
Responding this problem, the U.S. has established indirect methods of 
proof which allow special agents to “gather and present evidence to sup-
port the allegation”;As IRS mentions in its guidelines, “tax crimes are 
often acts of individual greed and, therefore, very little “direct evidence” 
is usually available and depending on the facts and circumstances of each 
investigation, the subject’s correct taxable income may be established by 
“direct” or several “indirect” methods of proof, usually using circum-
stantial or “indirect” evidence.”186 This indirect evidence will be used to 
decide what “income should have been reported on the subject’s return 
and compare the result to the amount shown on the filed return”187
Nonetheless, “sources of income may not be identifiable, as in a 
specific item method of proof, thus taxable income often has to be com-
puted indirectly based upon the tax payer’s application of use of funds.” 
188In using indirect methods of proof, the agents must “establish a prima 
facie understatement of income” which obligates the defendant to de-
fend his or her claim. A court may find fraud sustained if the defendant 
has offered no adequate explanation of the difference between “(on the 
one hand) expenditures, bank deposits, and increases in net worth and 
183 Anderson, supra note 181, 1288
184 Ibid
185 Ibid
186 Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.2.2 Indirect Methods 
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(on the other hand) the amount of reported income.” 189
The IRS guidance mentions there are two approaches when it comes 
to use indirect methods of proof. If a tax payer has maintained his or 
her books and records, then the agents may use basic approach in which 
they may have to trace the books and specify the unreported income 
items; however, if they found it is difficult to specify unreported income 
because there are no accurate books or records, the agents may have to 
apply aggregate approach. This approach requires the agents to con-
duct specific item investigation of all income and compare the resulted 
income to the subject taxable income.190further, the specific investiga-
tion may be applied by looking through third party books and records, 
but 191the agents are not obligated to identify the individual items that 
increased the tax payer’s income. 192
1. The Net-Worth Method
The oldest indirect method of proof is the net worth method. The 
IRS has used this method for over fifty years to “satisfy one of the 
elements of proof is necessary to obtain a conviction for income tax 
evasion.”193 Special agents use the net worth method when they sus-
pect a taxpayer is hiding increases in wealth, especially increases com-
ing from non-taxable sources like gifts.194Conducting an investigation 
of this increasing of wealth is challenging because the suspect would 
likely “do not have sufficient books and records, or books and records 
are not available, or the taxpayer withhold the books and records.”195 
The net worth method solves this problem by “providing probative cir-
cumstantial evidence which may be corroborated with other evidence 
of the substantive crime.”196
In using this method, the special agents must establish correct tax-
able income, which can be broken down into four steps. First, the spe-
189 Ibid
190 Internal Revenue 5, supra note 194
191 Ibid
192 Ibid
193 Nossen, supra note 177, 1020
194  Internal Revenue 5, supra note 194.
195 Ibid
196 Nossen, supra note 177, at 1020
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cial agents have to establish the subject’s net worth at the beginning and 
end period. After that they may deduct the beginning period’s net worth 
from the ending period; this way, they may see the change of net worth 
(assets less liabilities).197 Second, this change is adjusted for personal liv-
ing expenses, nondeductible losses, and nontaxable items to arrive at a 
corrected adjusted gross income figure, so then the agents may find gross 
income.198 Third, this gross income is adjusted to itemized deductions to 
correct the taxable income figure.199 Finally, the agents may determine 
whether the subject failed to report any taxable incomes by comparing 
the corrected taxable income with the reported taxable income.200
In general, while courts have held that the net worth method is con-
stitutional to be used in criminal cases, some questions remain: whether 
this method requires corroborating evidence derived from direct meth-
ods of proof; whether the government submitted sufficient evidence; 
whether expert witness testimony is admissible; how to establish the 
burden of proof; and whether the government has to negate all income 
to establish correct taxable income. The IRS uses Holland v. United 
States as guidance to respond those issues.
The Court in Holland affirmed the trial judgment where the defen-
dants, Mr. and Ms. Holland, who had a hotel, a bar, and a restaurant, 
were found guilty of failing to report $19,736.74 of income. Before 
coming to the decision in Holland, the court answered some issues re-
lated to the use of net worth method. 
First, to the question of corroboration validity, the Court cited to 
Capone v. United States where the Court held that the indictments were 
sufficient to uphold the demurrer and withstand the motion in arresting 
the defendant for tax evasion.201 In Capone, the defendant brought the 
case before the court arguing that the count 13 and 18 (misdemeanor) 
are unrelated directly and positively to other tax evasion counts;202 there-
fore the government cannot use the direct evidence of count 13 and 18 
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in corroboration with tax evasion counts.203The Court reasoned “each of 
counts directly and positively affirm and no return whatever was made 
to proper collector from the IRS and it is clear that the statute gives the 
IRS authority to receive and file the return fully warrants.” 204
Second, the court explained how courts should determine sufficien-
cy of evidence by citing to Guzik v. United States. 205In that case, de-
fendant argued that the government has failed to establish a net taxable 
income because it had lacked of accurate sources of the defendant’s 
income.206 The court held that the government has performed sufficient 
evidence to indict the defendant for tax evasion,207reasoned that the de-
fendant in this case was not charged by “deviation of official form;”208 
thus the finding would not be different even if the defendant could give 
more accurate information.209
Third, the court in Holland explained how courts must validate ex-
pert witness from the government by citing to United States v. Johnson.210 
In Johnson, the Court reversed and remanded the judgment because the 
court of appeal’s rule was error in determining that the jury could have 
been misled by the government’s expert witness.211 The Court in John-
son reasoned as long as a proper guidance has been delivered by a trial 
court then the jury has the authority to exercise the quality and weight 
of a testimony, and nothing could take it from the jury.212
Next, the Court in Holland examined the facts by considering the 
rulings of net worth method above. To the sufficiency of evidence in 
Holland, the Court ruled it is true that in tax evasion prosecution a de-
fendant has right to defend his or her; showing that in Holland, the 
defendants had appropriate accounting system, including books and 
records but the government had the authority to prove beyond their 
203 Ibid 
204 Ibid 
205 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121(1954)
206 Guzik v. United States, 54 f.2d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 1931)
207 Ibid. p. 621.
208 Ibid. p. 620.
209 Ibid 
210 Holland, supra note 213,126
211 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 520 (1943).
212 Ibid. p. 519.
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self-serving declarations using “all legal evidence to determine whether 
there is accurate.213
Moreover, the Court ruled that the government has performed suf-
ficient evidence to establish the defendants’ opening net worth,214 in 
which the government looked through their income sources and their 
expenses.215 To the issue of validity of government expert witness and 
jury instruction, the Court emphasized the instruction was not mis-
leading because it reflected “the concept of beyond reasonable doubt 
to the jury.”216 All of reasons above brought the Court to hold that the 
judgment must stand, although the government might not negate all of 
non-taxable income, all of the government’s evidence is convincing. 
Looking to discussion above, Holland has been noted as a very helpful 
case for lower courts in determining the constitutionality of net worth 
method application in tax evasion case.217
2. The Bank Deposit Method
Besides the net worth method, the U.S. special agents also use the 
bank deposit method to establish “understatement of taxable income” 
by “analyzing all of deposits and canceled checks which relate to any 
and all bank accounts controlled by the subject and documenting the 
subject’s currency expenditures and cash on hand.”218 Additionally, 
the bank deposit method is used when there is lacking of information 
from books and records.219 The IRS guidance for this method cites to 
Gleckman v. United States, 80 F. 2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935) to explain the 
213 Holland, supra note 213, 131-32.
214 The defendants argued the government failed to establish accurate opening net 
worth because the government only counted the stock costing $29,650 and $2,153.09 
and left aside the defendants’s cash on hand that they had kept in a canvas bag, a suit-
case, and a metal box. Id. at 133.
215 The government had presented to the jury that the defendants had spent small bills 
at that time. Although, the defendants claimed they had cash on hand and the husband 
had sold for about $50,000 in stock, the government found there was no receipt or 
dividends reported—showing that they had sold all stock that they have ever had. Id. 
at 134.
216 Ibid. at 139
217 See United States v. Hall, 650 f.2d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mas-
tropieri, 685 f.2d 776, 793 (2d Cir. 1982).
218 IRS Manual 2, supra note 10.
219 Id. 9.5.9.7.2 When to Use Bank Deposits Method.
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government’s obligation to establish evidentiary facts when it uses this 
method:
“The subject was engaged in an income-producing business, activity, or 
profession; the subject made periodic deposits of funds into his or her 
bank accounts, or into nominee bank accounts over which he or she ex-
ercised control, the deposits into the above referenced accounts reflect 
current year income and adequate investigation of deposits was made by 
the investigating special agent to negate the possibility that deposits arose 
from nontaxable sources, unidentified deposits have an inherent appear-
ance of income.”220
Like the net worth method, the bank deposit method also requires 
the government to establish taxable income. The IRS guidelines em-
phasize ownership of accounts or receiving money from other accounts 
is insufficient to establish taxable income.221 The government, at least, 
has to collect several evidentiary facts: “the subject has a business or 
other regular income source; the subject made regular deposits into an 
account; the subject draws against the account for personal use; there is 
testimony that the subject has income; and deposited amounts exceed 
exemptions and deductions.”222
Several steps should be taken by the agents to establish taxable in-
come. First, accumulating all incomes including all deposits (bank and 
other saving accounts, cash on hand and non-negotiated instruments, 
other saving and currency expenditures, and noncash income.223 Sec-
ond, to get the gross income, the investigators should deduct the accu-
mulating income with non income deposits and items (including loan, 
inheritance, decreasing cash on hand), and cash good sold.224 Third, this 
gross income should be deducted with total business expenses, and ad-
justment to income (including IRS deduction), then the investigators 
will get the corrected adjusted gross income.225 Fourth, to derive the cor-
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rected taxable income, this adjusted gross income should be deducted 
by itemized deductions/standard deduction (as corrected) and personal 
exemptions (as corrected).226 Finally, to get the additional taxable in-
come for criminal purposes, the special investigators have to deduct 
the corrected taxable income with reported taxable income from the 
subject.227
3. The Expenditure Method
The expenditure method is an indirect method of proof used when 
the agents indicate a taxpayer report “does not substantially increase 
during the period under investigation,” or if the agents notice “extrava-
gant living expenditures.”228 These expenditures may be shown by tan-
gible and intangible properties including food, gifts, and vacation, to 
third parties or stocks, bonds.229 The expenditure method is so similar 
with the net worth method; thus if the special agents use the expenditure 
method, they must also use the net worth method.230 When it comes to 
convincing the jury, the attorney will choose whichever is more persua-
sive in a given case.231
This method is conducted by establishing expenditures of the sub-
ject (money spent or applied).232 Next, to get the corrected adjusted gross 
income, the agents should deduct the calculation of expenditures with 
non-taxable sources of funds.233 The corrected adjusted gross income 
must be deducted by personal exemption;234 so the agents will get the 
corrected taxable income.235 Like other indirect methods of proof, the 
expenditure method is completed when the unreported income is found 
by deducting corrected taxable income with reported taxable income.236
226 Ibid 
227 Ibid 
228 IRS Manual 3, supra note 11, 9.5.9.6.2 When and How the Expenditures Method 












Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
4. The Cash Method
Another useful type of indirect method of proof is the cash meth-
od.237 This method is dedicated to seek unreported cash income which 
is usually related to the investigation for underlying crimes “involving 
bribery, drug dealing, and cash skimming from businesses, and simi-
lar situations where unreported income is in the form of cash.”238 The 
agents use the cash method when it comes to a subject who “has limited 
sources of income and deposits in bank accounts where non-cash uses 
can be traced.”239 The cash sources include cash returned on deposits, 
checks written to cash, cash withdrawn from financial accounts, cash 
contents of a safe deposit box, and cash on hand.”240 The formula of this 
method is started by calculating all of the cash uses.241 Next, the result 
calculation is deducted with known cash sources that will result in an 
additional taxable income (unreported income). 242
Like other indirect methods of proof, the cash method is only gov-
erned by IRS guidance; however it has been supported by many courts’s 
ruling. For instance, in United States v. Hogan where the defendant, 
Martin F. Hogan, once argued that the trial court was relied on inadmis-
sible evidence and invalids the use of cash method.243 The court held 
that the district court was not err on “the issues of severance and the 
admissibility of the cash method evidence.”244 First, the Court argued 
that the district court instruction to the jury was not err because it was 
the jury’s duty to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, including the 
tax experts. 245
Next, to Hogan’s argument that the cash method is “an untested 
and “unapproved circumstantial method of proof,”246 the court ruled 
237 IRS Manual 4, supra note 12, 9.5.9.8 Cash Method of Proving Income, updated 






243 United States v. Hogan, 886 f.2d 1497, 1508 (7th Cir. 1989).
244 Ibid. p. 1513.
245 Ibid. p. 1508
246 Ibid 
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that “under appropriate circumstances the cash method is an admissible 
method of proof if the government satisfies evaluation criteria similar 
to the traditional cash expenditures method.”247 Specifically, in reason-
ing, the court emphasized the facts that Hogan used to save his income 
in a bank account and spent his money through a banking institution, 
and did have limited sources of income, made the use of cash method is 
appropriate.248
Moreover, the defendant urged that the government failed to “iden-
tify cash on hand.”249 The court mentioned in using the cash method, 
there should be an assessment of cash on hand at the beginning of the 
first year; in this case, the court found that the government has estab-
lished sufficient investigation to establish cash on hand. Indeed, at the 
beginning of 1981, Hogan did not have cash on hand, no gifts, inheri-
tances, and other nontaxable income in 1980.250 Although “he had fancy 
boat and car, he was spending his money to pay interest and several 
loans and account at that time.”251These findings are supported by “the 
defendant’s testimony in the cross examination that he often received 
late payment notices from credit card companies and that one cred-
it card company had placed his account in the hands of its collection 
department.”252As a result, “the jury could have found with reasonable 
certainty that Hogan did not have any cash on hand at the beginning of 
1981.” 253
In summary, the court in Hogan provided better explanation what 
the government needs to establish in using the case method and what is 
the relation of cash method and expenditure method. Indeed, in this case, 
the use of cash method is appropriate because the defendant had a very 
limited sources of income.254 Additionally, like other indirect methods 
of proof, although in this case the government expert testified, the jury 
247 Ibid. p. 1509
248 Ibid
249 Ibid
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had the authority to decide the witness’s credibility.255 To the govern-
ment performance in establishing cash on hand, the government in Ho-
gan has performed sufficient evidence because it traced the defendant’s 
income and transaction.256 Finally, this section draws the U.S. approach 
in dealing with the illicit enrichment of public official; instead of crimi-
nalizing the illicit enrichment, the U.S. has developed financial disclo-
sure system that provides civil and criminal prosecution and tax evasion 
prosecution that during the investigation, the special agents may use 
indirect methods of proof. This investigation may lead to underlying 
crimes, prosecutors may use joinder counts in further prosecution.
V. WHY INDONESIA HAS TO CONSIDER TO REFORM ITS 
SYSTEM IN DEALING WITH ILLICIT ENRICHMENT
It appears that Indonesia has a promising system for supporting cor-
ruption eradication. However, so far, this system has not yet worked be-
cause there is no enforcement mechanism if a public official fails to file 
or gives false information, and there is no specific indirect methods of 
proof to investigate the financial disclosure statement that may strength 
evidence to convict corruption. As a result, there is no significant num-
ber of public officials who file their financial disclosure statements. By 
the same token, for registered financial disclosure statements, the KPK 
cannot use indirect proof to convict defendants of corruption. The Pros-
ecutor has the same problem in prosecuting tax evasion and joined it 
with other crimes.
Like Indonesia, the U.S. prefers not to criminalize illicit enrich-
ment, staying focused on civil and criminal prosecution for financial 
disclosure statement, and tax evasion. Different with Indonesia, how-
ever, U.S., financial disclosure statements are filled to institution where 
a public official works, but the U.S. Department of Justice (hereinafter 
DOJ) may bring civil and criminal charge for violation for failed to 
file and to give false information. for tax evasion, the IRS investigates 
suspicious tax reports where tax-payers hid their wealth to avoid tax. 
That wealth would possibly come from illegal income. Investigating 
255 Ibid. at 1508
256 Ibid. at 1510
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this tax reports, agents may find lack of direct evidence; thus they may 
use the indirect methods of proof, such as the net worth, bank deposit, 
expenditure, and cash methods.
This paper finds that while the U.S. approach sounds promising, 
there has been no discussion about this approach in Indonesia. Indeed, 
several Indonesian researchers have been conducting research projects 
focused on looking to countries which prefer or tend to criminalize il-
licit enrichment, such as Australia, and China. To that point, this section 
is dedicated to analyze why Indonesia should consider to looking at the 
U.S. approach to figure out what and how Indonesia may improve its 
own approach to illicit enrichment cases. First sub-section will show ra-
tionales to look at the U.S. approach. Next sub-section will present what 
improvement may be proposed and what possible barrier may be faced.
A. RATIONALES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO REFORM IN-
DONESIAN ILLICIT ENRICHMENT INVESTIGATION
Indonesia has been driven to combat corruption by the facts of ram-
pant and pervasive corruption not only steals state fund, violates citizen 
social and economic rights. Although, under international law jurisdic-
tion, corruption has not yet been classified as an extraordinary crime, 
but to emphasize Indonesian government commitment to combat cor-
ruption, the Corruption Act in its preamble states that corruption as an 
extraordinary crime that should be treated in extraordinary way.257 The 
extraordinary way includes prosecution and prevention that shall be in 
line with public aspiration.258 
Scholars and civil society, of course, support the government com-
mitment; but then the use term extraordinary creates heated debates. 
The government creates severe punishment in order to deter not only 
defendants, but also to prevent other people to commit the same of-
fenses. It turns out by providing both criminal and economy sanctions 
under the Combating Corruption Act. Even this Act allows prosecutors 
to charge a defendant with capital punishment if he or she commits cor-
ruption in critical or emergency situation, such as natural disaster state 
fund or economic crisis; or continuing corruption.
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In fact, severe punishments are not a panacea to combat corrup-
tion—to decrease people commits this offense—a number of research 
show that enhancing certainty in prosecution is more effective to deter 
rather than creates more severe punishment.259 Besides in imposing se-
vere punishments, the government has to deal with human rights issue 
where Indonesian Constitution protect the right to live,260 but it also al-
lows the government to create laws to impose severe punishment when 
it comes to crimes that cause massive and serious damage to society.261 
It turns out, reality is far from what the Clean-State Act and the 
Combating Corruption Act want to achieve. Fifteen years after the es-
tablishment of those Acts, corruption is still pervasive.262 Severe pun-
ishments governed by the Corruption Act do not influence people to 
avoid to do corruption.263 It is not because those punishments are not 
severe enough; scholars have found the problem is the uncertainty of 
Indonesian criminal justice system.264 Indeed, during July 2012-june 
2013, the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) found there were 753 
corruption cases.265 Most of them got low sentences: probation for 4 
defendants, one year imprisonment for 185 defendants, one-two years 
imprisonment for 167 defendants, two-five years imprisonment for 217 
defendants, five-ten years for 35 defendants, and above ten years for 
259 It can be seen by looking to several studies conducted by the Institute of Criminolo-
gy at Cambridge University, DANIEL NAGIN AND GREG POGARSKY, VALERIE 
WRIGHT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL Justice Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity 
of Punishment, The Sentencing Project 4, ( 2010) , available at http://www.sentenc-
ingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf.
260 Indonesian Constitution art. 28 A.
261 Id. art. 28 J (2).
262 See generally, Toto Suryaningtyas, Reformasi Hukum Sebatas Jargon Semu, UNI-
SOSDEM, http://www.unisosdem.org/article_detail.php?aid=6251&coid=3&caid=2
1&gid=3 (last visited May 22, 2014).
263 See generally, Yuni Arisandy, ICW: Pengambilan Aset Sanksi Efektif Bagi Koruptor 
[ICW: Asset Recovery Would Deter Corruptors], ANTARA NEWS (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/404856/icw- pengambilan-aset-sanksi-efektif-
bagi-koruptor.
264 Tebang Pilih Sangat Kentara: Pemberantasan Korupsi di Daerah Mandek [Selec-
tive Prosecution Revealed: Law Enforcement Has Been Stuck], ANTI KORUPSI-
ICW (March 7, 2006), http://www.antikorupsi.org/id/content/tebang- pilih-sangat-
kentara-pemberantasan-korupsi-di-daerah-mandek.
265 Indonesia Corruption Watch et. al., supra note 60, at 26
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five defendants, besides five defendants got releases.266 If we look case 
by case, we could see the disproportionality of punishments.267 As the 
Indonesian chapter of this paper mentioned the Combating Corruption 
Act has many provisions that give the opportunity to prosecutors and 
judges to exercise their powers.268 Senior level of public officials who 
committed corruption mostly got lower punishments, but it does not 
work for lower level of public officials who committed the same of-
fenses.269 The disproportionality then causes lack of trust to the legal 
apparatus especially to the Attorney and the Supreme Court. This paper 
recommends that instead of figuring out how to criminalize and set up 
severe punishment for illicit enrichment, Indonesian government has 
to consider staying focus not to criminalize, but improve its financial 
disclosure system and tax evasion prosecution. The Indonesian gov-
ernment may look to the U.S. approach, and choose which part may be 
useful and applicable. 
First, there are some similarity and differences of Indonesia and the 
U.S. financial disclosure system. Both countries obligate senior public 
officials from three branches of government: executive, legislative, and 
judicial to file financial disclosure statement before, during, and after 
office period that includes report of assets, income, and liabilities. In 
general, the purpose of financial disclosure system is to prevent conflict 
of interest and illicit enrichment.270 For illicit enrichment, scholars found 
that “enhancing the effectiveness of [financial disclosure] system as a 
tool for the prosecution of corruption, or for the prosecution of corrup-
tion, or for the detection and return of stolen assets is a corollary of the 
[purpose] of financial disclosure system.”271
266 Ibid 
267 Antikorupsi-ICW, supra note 272
268 See Combating Corruption Act, supra note 3, art. 2, 3, 5, and 12.
269 See generally, Ujang Idrus, Legislator: Pemberantasan Korupsi Jangan Tebang 
Pilih [Lawmakers: Combating Corruption Should Be Impartial], ANTARANEWS 
(March 12, 2014), http://www.antaranews.com/berita/423682/legislator-pemberan-
tasan-korupsi-jangan-tebang-pilih. =
270 Ruxandra Burdescu, et al, Income and Asset Declarations: Tools And Trade-Offs 
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The finding reflects what has happened in Indonesia. Historically, 
illicit enrichment of public official happened massively under Soeharto 
era (dictatorship regime).272 Soeharto, his family, along with his col-
leagues were extremely enriched during his presidency. 273At that time 
there were no sufficient laws and independent legal apparatus taken 
place to prosecute them.274 Learning from that experience, Indonesia 
established financial disclosure system under the Clean-State Act and 
the KPK under the Combating Corruption Act and the KPK Act. Mean-
while, in the U.S., financial disclosure was bought to people’s attention 
as a response to the Watergate scandal.275 In brief, the scandal was about 
illegally breaking to the Democratic National Committee offices by 
Nixon’s administration.276 This incident was believed related to Nixon’s 
re-election campaign in which Nixon tried to cover up by raising hush 
money to pay the burglars, and destroying evidences.277 Since then the 
U.S. established two laws to dealing with transparency and ethics: the 
federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and from the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978.278
Although both countries have the similar experience, Indonesia and 
the U.S. included financial disclosure under different systems. Indone-
sia inserted financial disclosure into corruption eradication regime un-
der the Clean-State Act—and it became stronger with the establishment 
272 According TI, Soeharto was the most corrupt president in the globe. He got more 
than $15-35 million from his 32 years presidency. TI: Mantan Presiden Soeharto Pe-
mimpin Paling Korup di Dunia [TI: Soeharto, former President of Indonesia Was the 




274 Gusti Grehenson, Setelah Ada KPK, Kinerja Kepolisian and Kejaksaan Naik [After 
the Establishment of KPK, the Kepolisian and the Kejaksaan Have Been Improved], 
UGM (Nov. 15, 2013), http://ugm.ac.id/id/berita/8410- setelah.ada.kpk.kinerja.ke-
polisian.dan.kejaksaan.naik.
275 Burdescu, et al, supra note 281, p. 28
276 Watergate, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/watergate (last visited April 
12, 2014).
277 Mark Stencel, The Reform, WASHINGTON POST (June 13, 1997), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/national/longterm/watergate/legacy.htm; See generally, 
John Blake, Forgetting A Key Lesson From Watergate? CNN.COM (feb. 4, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/04/politics/watergate-reform/.
278 Ibid
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of the Combating Corruption Act and the KPK Act that mentions the 
result of financial disclosure investigation may be used to strengthen the 
evidence in corruption prosecution—essentially financial disclosure is 
seen as morality obligation because there is no civil and criminal pros-
ecution. Interestingly, the US established financial disclosure system 
under the ethic Act, but it provides civil and criminal prosecution for 
public officials who fail or give false with imprisonment and fine sanc-
tion. Meanwhile, the Indonesian laws provide administrative sanction 
that is not specifically explained.
According to the UNODC, preferences to provide civil and crimi-
nal prosecution depend on the goals of financial disclosure system. If 
the system is created to investigate illicit enrichment, then governments 
may focus on monitoring public official’s wealth with the goal to detect 
the “concealment or theft of assets” and provide “administrative and 
criminal sanctions, including heavy fines.”279 In contrast, if the goal is 
to prevent conflict of interest that will lead to ethics misbehavior, then 
the sanction is unnecessary.280 When look at the Indonesian government 
intention on inserting financial disclosure into the Clean-State Act, and 
supported by the Combating Corruption Act, it must be clear that the 
financial disclosure system is meant to be an active tool to detect cor-
rupt offenses; therefore providing civil and criminal prosecution with 
administrative, imprisonment, and fine sanctions will be necessary.
Furthermore, there should be a method to investigate illicit enrich-
ment showed by financial disclosure statement that may lead to cor-
rupt offenses. The Indonesian government should consider developing 
indirect methods of proof like what the U.S. has in its tax prosecution. 
These indirect methods of proof may be varied such as net worth meth-
od, bank deposit, cash and expenditure methods. Looking to resources 
that Indonesia already has, those indirect methods of proof may be in-
corporated to financial disclosure system under the KPK and tax eva-
sion prosecution under the Civil Tax Investigator.
Practically, this paper suggests when it comes to a suspicious finan-
cial disclosure statement, the KPK may ask the Civil Tax Investigator 
for more information about the suspect’s tax return along with their 




Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
families and colleagues that may be related with his alleged corrupt 
offenses. Those institutions may work together to investigate the illicit 
enrichment, and the KPK may prosecute for civil or criminal prose-
cution of financial disclosure violation along with joinder corrupt of-
fenses. The same collaboration may be established, when the Civil Tax 
Investigator finds a suspicious tax return that may be related to corrup-
tion. This institution may ask the KPK about the financial disclosure in-
formation. Further, if there is substantial evidence to continue to joinder 
prosecution of tax evasion and corruption, the KPK may supervise the 
Kejaksaan in this regard. Of course, those institutions also need to col-
laborate with the PPATK when it comes to investigate bank and other 
accounts.
To implement those ideas, there must be amendment of the KPK Act 
and the Combating Corruption Act by adding a special chapter about 
illicit enrichment which includes law enforcement mechanism for fail-
ure to file or to give false information of financial disclosure, joining 
charges of financial disclosure and tax evasion with corruption. In ad-
dition, the Acts should incorporate with memorandum of understand-
ing on investigating illicit enrichment between the KPK, the Civil Tax 
Investigator, the Attorney, and the PPATK. This graphic below shows 
the new approach of investigating illicit enrichment.
This paper finds several advantages that Indonesia would get if the 
government implements the ideas. First, the government does not have 
to face constitutional issues as consequences of criminalizing illicit en-
richment because this paper suggests another way to address illicit en-
richment. Second, by applying the indirect methods of proof, Indonesia 
would not only improve its law enforcement to combat corruption, but 
also to increase the conviction rate of tax evasion. Third, as the legal ap-
paratus would perform better, Indonesia would get more asset recovery 
both from corruption and tax evasion convictions.
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feature 1: Proposed Law Enforcement Mechanism
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B. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES AND OVERCOME STRATEGIES IN 
REfORMING INDONESIAN ILLICIT ENRICHMENT INVES-
TIGATION
As the UNODC mentions in its report, investigating illicit enrich-
ment and preventing conflict of interest “require management and ac-
countability arrangements in terms of human resources, budget, tech-
nology, and facilities.” These requirements would also be possible
challenges if the Indonesian government establishes civil and crimi-
nal prosecution for financial disclosure system, incorporates the indi-
rect methods of proof and joinder violation of corruption and tax eva-
sion prosecution.
First, the lacking of government political will would likely be a 
challenge to reform the approach to illicit enrichment; however, the 
reform of laws may still have chances in the future because the Cor-
ruption Act and the KPK Act has been put on bill lists of Indonesian 
Parliament (DPR) since 2010.281 In addition, Indonesia is now holding 
Election for new government. Clearly, all of candidates promise there 
would be improvement law enforcement for corruption.282 Despite the 
decreasing of public distrust to election, this momentum may be used 
to push the new government to prove their promises. As usual, the new 
government will be very concern with their public image at the begin-
ning of their leadership.283
Second, the quantity and quality of human resources specifically in 
281 Prolegnas 2010-2014, DIREKTORAT JENDRAL PERATURAN PERUNDANG-
UNDANGAN, KEMENTERIAN HUKUM DAN HAK ASASI MANUSIA, http://
ditjenpp.kemenkumham.go.id/prolegnas-2010-2014.html (last visited April 16, 2014).
282 Fiddy Anggriawan, Janji Pemberantasan Korupsi Masih Mendominasi [Promises 
to Enhance Law Enforcement to Combat Corruption Have Dominated], OKEZONE.
COM,http://pemilu.okezone.com/read/2014/03/20/567/958319/janji-pemberantasan-
korupsi-masih-mendominasi.
283 for instance, President Yudhono (2004-2009, and 2009-present) has used improv-
ing law enforcement performance to combat corruption as main campaign and it has 
been proven he tried to keep good image in the first 100 days of his leadership by 
enacting President Memorandum about Combating Corruption. See generally, Ihsan 
Dalimunte, Skandal Century Awal Tumpulnya Taji SBY Berantas Korupsi [Century 
Case, Beginning of SBY Failure to Combat Corruption], RMOL.CO (Oct. 2, 2011) 
http://www.rmol.co/read/2011/10/02/41178/Skandal-Century- Awal-Tumpulnya-Ta-
ji-SBY-Berantas-Korupsi-.
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the KPK and the Civil Tax Investigator, as a new independent institu-
tion the KPK has an outstanding performance showing within five years 
this institution was able to reach 100% conviction rate.284 To some cases, 
the KPK took quite long time.�According to the ICW, the KPK would 
have done better if this Institution is supported by sufficient number of 
investigators.� The commissioner of Hong Kong Corruption Eradica-
tion Commission (ICAC) shares his concern that the 750 personals of 
KPK have to look out for five million civil servants, 500,000 police of-
ficers, with 200 million citizens.� As a result, the KPK has a number of 
workloads as shown by this table.�
feature 2: the workloads of KPK
Year Prelimenary Probes Investigations Prosecutions Verdicts
2009 67 49 61 34
2010 54 62 55 38
2011 78 66 45 34
However, this condition would not be a problem because the KPK is 
not meant to be the one and only institution to combat corruption. This 
institution has been working together with the Attorney, the PPATK, the 
Police, and other special intelligences. This collaboration should also 
be implemented in investigating illicit enrichment. For instance, the At-
torney has more 8500 prosecutors all over Indonesia;285 The Police has 
284 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CENTER (U4), AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
RULE? WHY INDONESIA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION SUCCEEDS 




285 Djibril Muhammad, Punya 8500 Penyidik, Kejagung Tunggu Permintaan KPK 
[The Kejagung Waits for KPK to Coordinate its 8500 Prosecutors], ROL REPUBLIKA 
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special subdivision of corruption which consists of 600 investigators286 
and there are more 32000 tax officers.287 These numbers of apparatus 
along with sufficient technology would likely give more opportunity 
to investigate illicit enrichment. Additionally, there are many ways to 
enhance the skills of investigators. For one, holding more seminars and 
workshops would be necessary.
Second, investigating illicit enrichment would likely spend more 
money to set up the technology and enhancing the skills of investiga-
tors; however this challenge may be overcome by collaborating finan-
cial opportunity of the institutions (the KPK, the PPATK, the Attorney, 
the Police, the Tax Investigator). Notably, some of those institutions 
have started to work with legal apparatus all over the globe sharing 
legal information especially when it comes to money laundering and as-
set recovery. As a follow up, Indonesian investigators may invite these 
foreign investigators to share their experience. Unconventional train-
ing, such as teleconference, may also be used that would likely cut the 
expenses.
Third, inflexibility of court jurisdiction in Indonesia would be a 
challenge in integrating financial disclosure and tax evasion prosecu-
tion with corruption. This paper has been discussing that the KPK has 
authority for registering and investigating financial disclosure. The 
finding in financial disclosure investigation may be used by the KPK to 
strengthen the evidence in prosecuting corruption in which the special 
court of corruption has jurisdiction of it. Meanwhile, tax evasion pros-
ecution is under the tax regime where Civil Tax Investigator is leading 
investigation and passes the case to Attorney for prosecution under the 
Special Court of Tax jurisdiction. for the idea of establishing financial 
disclosure criminal and civil prosecution, this paper urges the govern-
286 Dani Prabowo, Polri Akui Kekurangan Penyidik Kasus Korupsi [Indonesian Na-
tional Police Admits Having Lack of Investigators], Kompas.com (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/11/12/1406543/Polri.Akui.Kekurangan.Pe-
nyidik.Kasus.Korupsi.
287 Dina Mirayanti Hatauhuruk, Dirjen Pajak: Banyak Pegawai Pajak ‘Bandel’! [The 
Head of Direktorat Pajak: There Are Many Negligence Officers],OKEZONE.COM 
(May 20, 2013), http://economy.okezone.com/read/2013/05/20/20/809474/dirjen-
pajak-banyak-pegawai-pajak-bandel.
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ment should add joined of tax evasion with corruption charge under 
the Special Court of Corruption jurisdiction, historically and practically 
speaking, this court has been handling corroboration of money launder-
ing and corruption. Under Indonesian Money Laundering Act stipulates 
that money laundering should be held by a court which has jurisdiction 
of the predicate or underlying crime.288 Furthermore, the idea to cor-
roborate evidence on tax evasion and corruption and join those charges 
would likely to be resolved under flexibility of special court of corrup-
tion jurisdiction. This paper suggests that if a tax evasion charge related 
to corruption it should be held in the special court of corruption. This 
argument is supported, again, by the experience in prosecuting money 
laundering. 289
VI. CONCLUSION
Although there has been robust improvement in Indonesian legal 
frameworks, corruption remains as a big problem, imposing economic, 
social, and political costs in Indonesia. One issue contributing to this 
lack of stability is illicit enrichment of public officials. Instead of com-
plying with Article 20 UNCAC which recommends criminalizing illicit 
enrichment of public officials, in Indonesia illicit enrichment of public 
official is monitored by the KPK through financial disclosure of public 
officials and may be used to strengthen the evidence in corruption pros-
ecution. However, to date, there is no law to allow the civil and criminal 
prosecution for failing to file or to give false statement, nor does the law 
describe the specific methods of proof which may be used by the KPK 
to investigate the illicit enrichment. As a result, this system does not 
work. Only few public officials file their financial disclosure statements; 
meanwhile there are no further steps to investigate the registered finan-
cial disclosure statements. This paper urges the Indonesian government 
to consider adapting the U.S. approach, where illicit enrichment has 
been addressed by criminal and civil prosecution of financial disclosure 
along with tax evasion prosecution that may be joined with corruption 
charge. The U.S. tax investigators use indirect methods of proof, such 
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as the net worth, bank deposit, and cash expenditure, to proof indirectly 
tax evasion and other underlying crimes. This approach would be ben-
eficial to Indonesia for strengthening both corruption and tax evasion 
prosecutions because the Indonesian legal apparatus will enable to use 
both financial disclosure statement and tax return in finding evidence of 
illicit enrichment that may be use in corruption prosecutions.
Finally, this paper recommends that the Indonesian government 
amend the KPK Act and the Combating Corruption Act by adding a 
special chapter about illicit enrichment. This chapter should include law 
enforcement mechanisms for failure to file, for giving false information 
on financial disclosures, and for joining charges of financial disclosure 
and tax evasion with corruption. In addition, the Acts should be sup-
ported by a memorandum of understanding on investigating illicit en-
richment between the KPK, the PPATK, the Civil Tax Investigator, the 
Attorney and the Police. Some possible challenges to this recommen-
dation are the quality and quantity of investigators, financial barriers, 
and court jurisdiction. These challenges, however, may be overcome by 
integrating the resources from each of these law enforcement institu-
tions, enhancing network with foreign legal apparatus, and integrating 
financial disclosure prosecution and tax evasion under special court of 
corruption when corruption is an underlying offense.
REFERENCES
Conventions
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption [IACAC], Marc 29, 1996, reprint-
ed in 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996), avalaible at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
treaties/b-58.html.
United Nations Convention Against Corruption [UNCAC], Dec. 14, 2005, 2349 
U.N.T.S 41, avalaible at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/
Publications/Convention/08- 50026_E.pdf.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime [UNTOC], Sept. 
29, 2003, 2225 U.N.T.S 209.
United Nations Materials
United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Legislative Guide for the Implemen-
tation of UNTOC, 2004, available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/
CTOC/legislative-guide.html
United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Legislative Guide for the Implemen-
tation of the UNCAC (2006), avalaible at https://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/
CoC_LegislativeGuide.pdf.
118Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
Criminal Liability of Public Officials for Illicit Enrichment: Comparing Approaches...
Organization of American States Materials,
Departement of International Law the Organization of American States, Signatories and 
Ratifications B-58: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,[hereinafter 
Reservation to IACAC] http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-58.html (last 




Indonesia Constitution (1945) (as amended 2002).
Law
Undang-Undang tentang Pencucian Uang [Money Laundering Act], Act No. 8, 2010.
Undang-Undang Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 jo. Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 2000 
jo. Undang-Undang 6 Tahun 1983 tentang Ketentuan Umum dan Tata Cara Per-
pajakan [Indonesian Taxation Act], 2007.
Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 2004 tentang Kejaksaan [Prosecutor Act]
Undang-Undang tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi [KPK Act], Act. No. 30, 2002.
Undang-Undang tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi [Combating Corrup-
tion Act], Act. No. 31, 1999 jo. Act. No 20, 2001.
Undang-Undang tentang Penyelenggara Negara yang Bersih dan Bebas Korupsi 
[State Clean Act], Act. No. 28, 1999.
Undang-Undang tentang Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana [Criminal Pro-
cedural Act], Act. No. 8, 1981.
Agency Regulations
Keputusan KPK tentang Tata Cara, Pendaftaran, Pengumuman, dan Pemerik-
saan Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara [Memorandum of KPK 
for Government Official Income and Asset Disclosure], Memo No. KEP/07/
KPK/02/2005.
Surat Edaran Menteri Negara Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara Nomor: SE/03/M.
PAN/01/2005 tentang Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara [Adminis-
tration Minister Memorandum about financial Disclosure Statement], 2005.
Agency Materials
KPK, WAJIB LAPOR LHKPN [PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO ARE OBLIGATED TO 
FILE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS], ACCH http://acch.kpk.go.id/
wajib-lapor-lhkpn (last visited May 22, 2014).
Prolegnas 2010-2014, DIREKTORAT JENDRAL PERATURAN PERUNDANG-
UNDANGAN, KEMENTERIAN HUKUM DAN HAK ASASI MANUSIA, http://




1.S. Constitution. amend. V.
Statutes
Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax, 26 U.S.C.A. §7201 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113- 
119
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
93 (excluding P.L. 113-79)).
Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, 18 U.S.C.A. §201 (West, Westlaw through 
P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L. 113-79)).
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.A. App. 4. (West, Westlaw through P.L. 
113- 93 (excluding P.L. 113-79)).
fraud and false Statement, 26 U.S.C.A. §7206 ( West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-93 
(excluding P.L. 113-79)).
General Rule for Methods of Accounting, 26 U.S.C.A. §446 (West, Westlaw through 
P.L. 113-93 (excluding P.L. 113-79)).
Cases
Capone v. United States, 56 f.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1932).
friedberg v. United States, 348 US 142 (1954).
Guzik v. United States, 54 f.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1931).
Holland v. United States, 348 US 121 (1954).
Massei v. United States, 355 US 595 (1958).
Smith v. United States, 348 US 147 (1954).
United States v. Anderson, 809 f.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1987).
United States v. Calderon, 348 US 160 (1954).
United States v. Coyne, 4 f.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993).
United States v. Gant, 268 f. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2003).
United States v. Hall, 650 f.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1981).
United States v. Hogan, 886 f.2d 1497 (7th Cir. 1989).
United States v. Johnson, 319 US 503 (1943).
United States v. Kenny, 645 f.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1981).
United States v. Kopituk, 690 f.2d 1289 (11th Cir. 1982).
United States v. Mastropieri, 685 f.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1982).
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
United States v. Todaro, 744 f.2d 5 (2nd Cir, 1984).
Agency Regulations
Internal Ravenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.7 Bank Deposits Method of 
Proving Income, updated November 5, 2004, available at http://www.irs.gov/
irm/part9/irm_09-005-009-cont01.html.
Internal Ravenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.8 Cash Method of Proving 
Income, updated November 5, 2004, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/
irm_09- 005-009-cont01.html.
Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.2.2 Indirect Methods, updated 
March 19, 2012 avalaible at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009.html.
Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9 Methods of Proof, 9.5.9.6. Expenditures Method of 
Proving Income, updated November 5, 2004, available at http://www.irs.gov/
irm/part9/irm_09-005-009.html#d0e1812.
Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.9, .9.5.9.5 The Net Worth Method of Proof, updated 
March 19, 2012 avalaible at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009.html.
The Departement of Justice Criminal Tax Manual 31.00 Net Worth Method, updated 
June 2012, http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/2001ctm/31ctax.html.
120Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
Criminal Liability of Public Officials for Illicit Enrichment: Comparing Approaches...
Agency Materials
Background, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, SECRETARIAT OF LE-
GAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL COOPERATION, http://www.oas.
org/juridico/english/corr_bg.html.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTEMENT OF JUS-
TICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/.
OTHER FOREIGN NATIONAL STATUES
The India Prevention of Corruption Act No. 48 of 1988, Chapter III: Offences and 
Penalties, Point 13, September 9, 1988, available at http://www.persmin.gov.
in/DOPT/EmployeesCorner/Acts_Rules/PCAct/pcact.pdf (last visited May 5, 
2014).
BOOKS
Ali, Shaukat. Corruption A Third World Perspective (1985) 
Borowiak, Craig T., Accountability and Democracy, The Pitfalls and Promise of Popular 
Control (2011).
Brickey, Katheleen f. Corporate and White Collar Crime Cases and Materials (2011) 
Burdescu, Ruxandra, et al, Income and Asset Declarations: Tools and Trade Offs. 
(2009).
Butt, Simon. Corruption and Law In Indonesia (2008).
Harris, Robberth, Political Corruption: In and Beyond the Nation State (2003).
Heidenheimer, Arnold J, Michael Johnston and Victor T. Levine, Political Corruption 
(1949).
Klitgaard, Robert. Controlling Corruption (1988).
Mocthar, Akil, Pembalikan Beban Pembuktian Tindak Pidana Korupsi, [Shifting The 
Burden Of Proof In Corruption Prosecution] (2009).
Monterio. John B.Corruption: Control and Maladministration (1966).
Muzila, Lindy. et al. On the Take: Criminalizing Illicit Enrichment to fight Corruption 8 
(2012) 
Strader, J Kelly, Understanding White Collar Crime (2006).
REPORTS
Anti-Corruption Resource Center (U4) “An exception to the Rule? Why Indonesia’s 
Anti-Corruption Commission Succeeds Where Others Don’t-A Comparison With 




DANIEL NAGIN AND GREG POGARSKY,VALERIE WRIGHT, DETERRENCE IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY Of PUNISH-
MENT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2010), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf.
TI, EXPORTING CORRUPTION PROGRESS REPORT 2013: ASSESSING ENFORCE-
MENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING FOREIGN BRIBERY 
121
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
(2013), available at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/exporting_cor-
ruption_progress_report_2013_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd.
INDONESIA CORRUPTION WATCH - YAYASAN LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM 
INDONESIA- PUKAT UGM, IMPLEMENTASI DAN PENGATURAN ILLICIT EN-
RICHMENT (PENINGKATAN KEKAYAAN TIDAK SAH) DI INDONESIA [IMPLE-
MENTATION AND REGULATION OF ILLICIT ENRICHMENT IN INDONESIA] 
(2013).
KPK, GAP ANALYSIS STUDY REPORT; IDENTIFICATION OF GAPS BETWEEN 
LAWS/REGULATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND UNCAC (2012).
JACK MASKELL, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS AND PUB-
LICATION OF DISCLOSURE REPORTS LEGISLATIVE ATTORNEY, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, avalaible at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43186.pdf (2012).
PUSDIKLAT KEJAKSAAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA, PENELURUSAN ASET [AS-
SET TRACING], available at http://www.kejaksaan.go.id/pusdiklat/uplimg/file/
PENELUSURAN%20ASET.pdf.
MUHAMMAD YUSUF, IMPLEMENTASI DAN PENGATURAN ILLICIT ENRICH-
MENT DALAM DELIK KORUPSI [IMPLEMENTATION AND REGULATION 
OF ILLICIT ENRICHMENT IN COMBATING CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAME-
WORK], http://www.antikorupsi.org/sites/antikorupsi.org/files/doc/Audit%20
Keuangan/PPATK_I mplementasi%20Illicit%20Enrichment-MYusuf.pdf (pre-
sented feb. 18, 2014).
JOURNALS
Allan G. Burrow, Effective Cross-Examination: A Practical Approach for Prosecutors 
Part II, 44 ADVOCATE 8 (2001).
Anthony F. Arguijo, Worth Another Look: Net-Worth Discovery Standards in Texas, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 1433 (2011).
Calvin H. Johnson, The Illegitimate “Earned” Requirement in Tax and Non-Tax Ac-
counting, 50 TAX L. REV. 373 (1995).
Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Restitution Rollout: The Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407 (2011).
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 
32 UCLA L. REV. 784 (1985).
Ethan Bercot, John Thompson, Tax Violations, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1559 (2013).
Gregory Harbaugh, A Tradition of Asset Protection: Wealth Preservation Strategies 
for Pittsburgh’s High Net-Worth Individuals, 1 No. 11 LAWYERS J. 7 (1999).
Ian M. Comisky, The Likely Source: An Unexplored Weakness in the Net Worth Meth-
od of Proof, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1981).
John T. Simpson, Jr., Discovery of Net Worth in Bifurcated Punitive Damages Cases: 
A Suggested Approach After Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 37 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 193 (1996).
Kathleen Barney, Special Focus Computer Forensics: This Thing Called Forensic 
Accounting, 43-AUG ARIZ. ATT’Y 34 (2007).
Laura M. Cohen et all, Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime Substantive Crimes: Tax 
Evasion, 30 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 961 (1993).
122Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
Criminal Liability of Public Officials for Illicit Enrichment: Comparing Approaches...
Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider Trading, and Problems 
of Proof, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1421 (1991).
Lucinda A. Low et. al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A Com-
parison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 243, 281-82 (1998).
Luz Estella Nagle, The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin 
America, 26 fORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1649 (2003).
Marcus Schoenfeld, A Critique of The Internal Revenue Service’s Refusal to Disclose 
How It “Determined” A Tax Deficiency, and of the Tax Court’s Acquiescence with 
This View, 33 IND. L. REV. 517 (2000).
Margaret K. Lewis, Presuming Innocence, or Corruption in China, 50 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 287 (2012).
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and Interests in 
Combating Economic Crimes, 40 INT’L LAW. 909 (2006).
Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Cor-
ruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 793 
(2001).
R. Michael Northrup, Melinda R. Newman, In Search of Consensus on “Net Worth”, 
22 APP. ADVOC. 235 (2010).
Ray A. Knight, Lee G. Knight, Criminal Tax Fraud: An Analytical Review, 57 MO. 
L. REV. 175 (1992).
Richard A. Nossen,”One-On-One” Uncorroborated Testimony: the Dilemma of Pros-
ecutors, Defense Attorneys, and the Courts in Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Cases, 58 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019 (1983).
Robert J. Stuart, Taxpayer Procedures and Remedies in Tax Controversies: The Elu-
sive Maze of the “Net Worth” Limitations, 61 TAX LAW. 941 (2008).
Steven M. Levin, Illegal Gratuities in American Politics: Learning Lesson From the 
Sun-Diamond Case, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1813 (2000).
Teresa E. Adams, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges to White Collar Crimes: 
What Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing? 17 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 531 (2000).
Towner S. Leeper, Proving Tax Evasion by the Net Worth Method, 34 TEX. L. REV. 
606 (1956).
Willard H. DaSilva, The Critical Net Worth Statement, 79-DEC N.Y. ST. B.J. 53 (2007).
INTERNET AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA
1. Indra Akuntono, KPK Akan Panggil Ibas Asalkan [KPK Would Arrest Ibas With 
Special Circumtances], KOMPAS.COM (DEC. 12, 2013).
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/12/12/1346464/KPK.Akan.Panggil.Ibas.asal-
kan.
Silvanus Alvin, 7 Tahun Tidak Lapor Kekayaan, Harta Ratu Atut Meningkat [Seven 
Years Ignored to File Financial Disclosure Statement, Atut Has Gained Enrich-
ment], LIPUTAN 6 (Oct. 12, 2013), http://news.liputan6.com/read/718485/7-ta-
hun-tidak-lapor- kekayaan-harta-ratu-atut-meningkat#sthash.n5ouE73t.dpuf.
Fiddy Anggriawan, Janji Pemberantasan Korupsi Masih Mendominasi [Promises to 
Enhance Law Enforcement to Combat Corruption Have Dominated], OKEZONE.
123
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
COM, http://pemilu.okezone.com/read/2014/03/20/567/958319/janji-pemberan-
tasan-korupsi- masih-mendominasi (last posted March 20, 2014).
Iqra Anugrah, Indonesia Long Journey Toward Democracy, GLOBAL POLITICS, 
http://www.global-politics.co.uk/issue9/iqra/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
Yuni Arisandy, ICW: Pengambilan Aset Sanksi Efektif Bagi Koruptor [ICW: Asset Re-
covery Would Deter Corruptors], ANTARA NEWS (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.
antaranews.com/berita/404856/icw-pengambilan-aset-sanksi-efektif-bagi- korup-
tor.
Rina Atriana, Gelar Resepsi Mewah, Sekretaris MA Nurhadi Belum Lengkapi Lapo-
ran Kekayaan [The Secretary of Supreme Court Ignored to File Financial Disclo-
sure Statement for Three Years], DETIK.CO (March 18, 2014), http://news.detik.
com/read/2014/03/18/065203/2528677/10/gelar-resepsi-mewah- sekretaris-ma-
nurhadi-belum-lengkapi-laporan-kekayaan.
Randy “Duke” Cunningham Completes Prison Sentence, ABC7 (June 4, 2013), http://
www.wjla.com/articles/2013/06/randy-duke-cunningham-completes-prison- sen-
tence-89652.html.
Tebang Pilih Sangat Kentara; Pemberantasan Korupsi di Daerah Mandek [Selec-
tive Prosecution Revealed: Law Enforcement Has Been Stuck], ANTI KORUPSI-
ICW (March 7, 2006), http://www.antikorupsi.org/id/content/tebang-pilih-san-
gat-kentara- pemberantasan-korupsi-di-daerah-mandek.
Oki Baren, Bisnis Cantik Mas Ibas [Ibas’s Fancy Business], GRESNEWS (Dec. 5, 
2011), http://gresnews.com/berita/somasi/1740512-bisnis-cantik-mas-ibas. Allie 
Bidwel, Majority of Americans Say Corruption Has Increased, US NEWS (June 
10, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/07/10/majori-
ty-of- americans-say-corruption-has-increased.
John Blake, Forgetting A Key Lesson From Watergate? CNN.COM (feb. 4, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/04/politics/watergate-reform/.
Kartika Chandra, Ibas Bantah Terima Duit Wisma Atlet [Ibas Urgued He Didn’t Receive 
Money From Wisma Atlet Scandal], TEMPO.CO (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.tempo.
co/read/news/2011/12/08/063370596/Ibas-Bantah-Terima-Duit- Wisma-Atlet.
Ihsan Dalimunte, Skandal Century Awal Tumpulnya Taji SBY Berantas Korupsi [Cen-
tury Case, Beginning of SBY Failure to Combat Corruption], RMOL.CO (Oct. 2, 
2011), http://www.rmol.co/read/2011/10/02/41178/Skandal-Century-Awal-Tum-
pulnya-Taji- SBY-Berantas-Korupsi-.
Rangga D. Fadhilah, ‘Weak’ KPK Set to Lose War: ICW, THE JAKARTA POST (July 
9, 2012), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/09/weak-kpk-set-lose-
war-icw.html (last posted July 9, 2012).
Edwin Firdaus, KPK Himbau Ratu Atut Segera Laporkan LHKPN [KPK Recom-
mends Ratu Atut to file Her financial Disclosure], Tribun Sumsel (Oct. 6, 2013), 
http://sumsel.tribunnews.com/2013/10/06/kpk-himbau-ratu-atut-segera-laporkan-
lhkpn.
Gusti Grehenson, Setelah Ada KPK, Kinerja Kepolisian and Kejaksaan Naik [After 
the Establishment of KPK, the Kepolisian and the Kejaksaan Have Been Im-
proved], UGM (Nov. 15, 2013), http://ugm.ac.id/id/berita/8410- setelah.ada.kpk.
kinerja.kepolisian.dan.kejaksaan.naik.
Zaki Al Hamzah, SBY: Cermati Korupsi Pajak [SBY: Monitors Corruption in Tax 
System], REPUBLIKA ONLINE (ROL) (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.republika.
124Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
Criminal Liability of Public Officials for Illicit Enrichment: Comparing Approaches...
co.id/berita/koran/news-update/13/12/09/mxjq7f-sby-cermati- korupsi-pajak.
Dina Mirayanti Hatauhuruk, Dirjen Pajak: Banyak Pegawai Pajak ‘Bandel’! [The 
Head of Direktorat Pajak: There Are Many Negligence Officers],OKEZONE.
COM (May 20, 2013), http://economy.okezone.com/read/2013/05/20/20/809474/
dirjen-pajak-banyak- pegawai-pajak-bandel.
Hendrizal, Pajak dan Masalah Transparansi [Tax and Problem of Transparency], 
PELITA (April 11, 2014),http://www.pelita.or.id/baca.php?id=92915.
Ed Henry & Mark Preston, Congressman Resigns After Bribery Plea: California Re-
publican admits selling influence for $2.4 million,CNN.COM (nov. 28, 2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/11/28/cunningham/.
Watergate, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/watergate (last visited April 12, 
2014).
TI: Mantan Presiden Soeharto Pemimpin Paling Korup di Dunia [TI: Soeharto, for-
mer President of Indonesia Was the Most Corrupt Leader], HUKUM ONLINE 
(March 26, 2004), http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol9987/ti-mantan-
presiden-soeharto- pemimpin-paling-korup-di-dunia-.
Tentang Sistem Pembuktian Terbalik [About Sifthing the Burden of Proof], HUKU-
MONLINE (MARCH 19, 2013), http://www.hukumonline.com/klinik/detail/lt-
513ff99d6eedf/tentang-sistem-pembalikan- beban-pembuktian.
Potensi Wajib Pajak di Indonesia Baru 67 Juta Orang [67 Million People: Small 
Possibility of Indonesian New Taxpayers], INFOBANKNEWS.COM (August 15, 
2012), http://www.infobanknews.com/2012/08/potensi-wajib-pajak-di-indone-
sia-baru-67-juta- orang/.
Ujang Idrus, Legislator: Pemberantasan Korupsi Jangan Tebang Pilih [Lawmakers: 
Combating Corruption Should Be Impartial], ANTARANEWS (March 12, 2014), 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/423682/legislator-pemberantasan-korupsi-
jangan-tebang-pilih.
Saldi Isra, Seratus Hari Tanpa Kejutan [100 days Without Any Suprises], ANTI KO-
RUPSI, http://www.antikorupsi.org/id/content/seratus-hari-tanpa-kejutan (pub-
lished January 28, 2005).
Astrid Felicia Lim, KPKPN Resmi Bubar [KPKPN officially Shut Down], DETIK.
CO (June 29, 2006),http://news.detik.com/read/2004/06/29/113149/169807/10/
kpkpn-resmi-bubar.
Bunga Manggiasih, Tuduh Ibas, Anas Urbaningrum Diminta Tunjukkan Bukti [Accused 
Ibas, Anas Urbaningrum Is Asked for Envidence], TEMPO. CO (Jan. 30, 2014), http://
www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/01/30/063549489/Tuduh-Ibas-Anas-Urbaningrum-Di-
minta-Tunjukkan-Bukti.
Richard Marosi, Contractor Gets 12 Years for Bribing Congressman, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES (feb. 20, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/20/local/me-duke20.
Adyan Mohamad, Kemenkeu Sanksi 83 Pegawai Karena Transaksi Mencurigakan 
[Ministry of finance Gives Sanctions to 83 Officials Who Have Been Tied Up with 
Suspicious Transaction], MERDEKA.COM (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.merdeka.
com/uang/kemenkeu-hukum-83-pegawai-karena-transaksi-mencurigakan.html
Djibril Muhammad, Punya 8500 Penyidik, Kejagung Tunggu Permintaan KPK [The 
Kejagung Waits for KPK to Coordinate its 8500 Prosecutors], ROL REPUB-




Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
Adnan Buyung Nasution, Reformasi Konstitusi di Indonesian [Constitutional Reform 
in Indonesia], HUKUM ONLINE, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/
hol4057/reformasi-konstitusi-di-indonesia (last posted November 1, 2001).
Abdul qodir, Rumah Nurhadi Terbesar di Dekat Senayan City [Nurhadi Has The Big-
gest House in Senayan City], Tribun News (March 18, 2014), http://www.tribun-
news.com/nasional/2014/03/18/rumah-nurhadi-terbesar-di-dekat- senayan-city.
Putri Artika R, KPK Imbau Nurhadi Lengkapi Laporan Harta Kekayaan [KPK Rec-
ommends Nurhadi to File His Financial Disclosure Statement], MERDEKA.
COM (March 14, 2013), http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/kpk-imbau-nurhadi-
segera- lengkapi-laporan-harta-kekayaan.html.
Sukma Indah Permana, ICW: Pendekatan Illicit Enrichment Bisa Maksimalkan Upa-
ya Pemiskinan Koruptor [ICW: Investigating Illicit Enrichment Would Support 
fighting Against Corruption], Detik.co (Nov.1, 2011),
  http://news.detik.com/read/2013/11/01/173946/2401813/10/icw-pendeka-
tan-illicit- enrichment-bisa-maksimalkan-upaya-pemiskinan-koruptor.
Dani Prabowo, Polri Akui Kekurangan Penyidik Kasus Korupsi [Indonesian Nation-
al Police Admits Having Lack of Investigators], Kompas.com (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/11/12/1406543/Polri.Akui.Kekurangan.
Penyidik.Kasus.Korupsi.
Wayan Agus Purnomo & Angga Sukma Wijaya, Soal Belanja Mewah Ratu Atut, Ini Kata 
Keluarga [Related to Shopping Life Style, Here Is What The Atut’s Family Thinks], TEM-
PO.CO (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/11/04/063526888/
Soal-Belanja- Mewah-Ratu-Atut-Ini-Kata-Keluarga.
Gusti Sawabi, Perintah Menyuap Akil Mochtar Diduga Datang dari Ratu Atut 
Chosiyah[Order to BribeAkhil Mochtar Was Suspected Came From Ratu Atut 
Chosiyah], Terungkap, Ratu Atut Kerap Belanja Keliling Dunia [Uncovered, Ratu 
Atut Often Goes Shopping Overseas], TEMPO. CO (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.tempo.
co/read/news/2013/11/04/063526886/Terungkap-Ratu-Atut-Kerap-Belanja- Keliling-
Dunia.
Herry Susanto, Membangun Kesadaran dan Kepedulian Sukarela Wajib Pajak [En-
hancing Awarness to Pay Taxes], PAJAK (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.pajak.go.id/
content/membangun-kesadaran-dan-kepedulian-sukarela-wajib-pajak.
Martha Thertina, PPATK Usulkan Ada RUU Perampasan Aset Koruptor [PPATK Pro-
poses Asset Recovery Bill], TEMPO.CO (April 16, 2013) http://www.tempo.co/read/
news/2013/04/16/092473857/PPATK-Usulkan-Ada-RUU-Perampasan-Aset-Ko-
ruptor.
KPK Arrests Banten Governor, THE JAKARTA POST (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.
thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/20/kpk-arrests-banten-governor.html.
TI, Corruption Perceprtion Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY, http://www.transparency.
org/cpi2012/results (last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
TI, Corruption Perceprtion Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY, http://www.transparency.
org/cpi2011/results/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2013)..
Arlette Saenz, Ferraris, Rolexes And A Shopping Spree: Inside The Extravagant Life 
Of Bob McDonnell And His Wife, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 21, 2014), http://abc-
news.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/01/ferraris-rolexes-and-a-shopping-spree-in-
side the-extravagant-life-of-bob-mcdonnell-and-his-wife/ (posted Jan 21, 2014).
David Sherfinski, Democratic Governors in VA also Took Expensive Gifts under Lax 
126Volume 13 Number 1 October 2015
Criminal Liability of Public Officials for Illicit Enrichment: Comparing Approaches...
State Law,WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2014/jan/27/virginia-governors-before-bob-mcdonnell-accepted-
l/?utm_source=RSS_feed&utm_medium=RSS.
Mark Stencel, The Reform,WASHINGTON POST (June 13, 1997), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/legacy.htm.
Toto Suryaningtyas, Reformasi Hukum Sebatas Jargon Semu, UNISOSDEM, http://
www.unisosdem.org/article_detail.php?aid=6251&coid=3&caid=21&gid=3 (last 
visited May 22, 2014). 
Rendi A. Witular & Hans David Tampubolon, First Family Tax Returns Raises 
Flags, THE JAKARTA POST (January 30, 2013), http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2013/01/30/first-family-tax-returns-raises- flags.html.
